THE LETTER AND THE SPIRIT

M. G. GLAZEBROOK

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THE LETTER AND THE SPIRIT

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THE FAITH OF
A MODERN CHURCHMAN

(Modern Churchman's Library)

THE LETTER AND THE SPIRIT

A REPLY TO THE BISHOP OF ELY'S CRITICISMS ON THE FAITH OF A MODERN CHURCHMAN

BY M. G. GLAZEBROOK, D.D.
CANON OF ELY



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PREFACE

In March 1918 I published a little book entitled *The Faith of a Modern Churchman*. Being the first of a series of manuals planned by the Churchmen's Union, it was intended to serve as an introduction to the other volumes, giving an outline of the whole subject of which they were to treat the parts in detail. "The author's first aim," I wrote in the preface, "has been to present something like a connected view of Church doctrine, as seen from the modern standpoint." To do this in just over a hundred pages, and without employing the technical terms which are the shorthand of theology, was a very difficult task. It demanded rigid compression, and many omissions. Especially it required the omission of those hesitations and qualifications which are so dear to the professional scholar and so puzzling to the ordinary reader: for, as every good teacher knows, outlines must be drawn firmly and boldly, or they make no impression. Quite deliberately, therefore, I adopted the method of stating in each case only the opinion which I believed to be best supported by weight of scholarship and inherent probability, and of stating it broadly: knowing that only thus could I meet the needs of the unlearned, and hoping that the learned would have charity and understanding enough to make allowances. Though not all the learned have justi-

fied my hope, the reception accorded to the book has, on the whole, been more favourable than I expected.

On page 71 of my manual the following words refer to the Virgin Birth of our Lord and the resurrection of the flesh: "It is impossible to prove a negative; it is not open to Christians to refuse belief on *a priori* grounds; and from very early times these miracles have been included in the Creeds. Modern Churchmen, therefore, do not deny that these wonders happened. But they do claim that, in view of the nature of the evidence, men should not be regarded as heretics who decline to affirm them."

Again on page 79, after mentioning other clauses of the Creed which are not taken in their literal sense, I wrote, "Are these the only clauses which may be or ought to be interpreted symbolically? The claim is being made in the case of two others—"Born of the Virgin Mary," and "He rose again from the dead."

Now in the year 1914 the Bishop of Ely had republished an old essay on these subjects, adding a somewhat minatory preface, in which he described how a bishop ought to deal with any of his clergy whose teaching was not sound in respect of them. Very naturally, therefore, he wrote to me to complain about the words quoted above from page 79. But I venture to think that he made a mistake in sending his letter to the press: for he thus converted a remonstrance into a challenge. Any one who reads his letter will see that I could not avoid making a public reply: and accordingly I wrote a long letter which was published in *The Times*. On the ground of authority, to which the bishop had limited his attack, my reply was, I believe, generally accepted as adequate. At any rate no answer was forthcoming: but my suggestion that

the way of reason was still open to him was followed by another letter to *The Times* in which he promised "publicly to challenge the arguments by which in his book *The Faith of a Modern Churchman* he endeavours to justify his conclusions."

That promise was fulfilled last December when he published a book with the title *Belief and Creed*. The first chapter contains a reply to my letter in *The Times*, which is too little convincing to demand any long notice. But the other four chapters are more important; for they contain an elaborate criticism of eight pages of my little manual. So, after much hesitation, I decided that it was my duty to defend a position which is not merely my own, but is held by many thousands of my fellow Churchmen.

The method adopted by the author of *B. and C.* is that of the scholastic controversialists—to take the incriminated pages paragraph by paragraph, or sentence by sentence, and to give a lengthy refutation of each in turn. It is a method which offers many advantages to the critic, but cannot be adopted in writing a reply: for a review of *B. and C.* on the same scale—of eight pages to one—would occupy some 2,500 pages. Clearly, therefore, I must adopt a different plan. After consideration I decided to proceed as follows:

Three of the chapters in *B. and C.* (ii, iii, and v) are short. Each of these, besides a variety of minor matters, contains two or three cardinal sentences, which appear to me to deserve serious examination. If the allegations of those sentences can be disproved, a refutation of the rest, however tempting, is not necessary. So I propose generally to confine my observations to those vital points.

The fourth chapter requires a different treatment

—though it occupies nearly half the book, most of it is devoted to what is really a side issue. Following many scholars of repute, I hold that St. Paul's teaching about the nature of the resurrection changed considerably during the period covered by his extant epistles. The Bishop of Ely, on the other hand, maintains (*B. and C.* p. 130) that "there does not exist a particle of evidence to show that St. Paul in the slightest degree changed his position in regard to the four fundamental beliefs which dominate his doctrine of the Resurrection." Though much importance attaches to the controversy, its decision could not decide the primary issue which was raised in our correspondence. The space which the Bishop devotes to it is altogether out of proportion. How could I best attempt to restore the argument to right proportions, and yet to give a sufficient justification of the statements made in my manual? It seemed necessary to restate my views at greater length, giving reasons and references on a moderate scale, and then to examine only the more important of the criticisms which have been offered. But in order that the reader may bestow his freshest attention upon that which is the real subject of debate, I have thought it well to devote my first chapters to the main issue.

For the same reason I have given the last place to my reply to the Bishop's first chapter, which revives the old controversy in *The Times*. I fear the defence is hardly more interesting than the attack; and what happened in April 1918 is now almost ancient history. Yet for the sake of completeness I feel obliged to devote a chapter to the subject.

ELY,
August 4th, 1919.

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NOTE

In order to avoid a tiresome repetition of names, quotations from the Bishop of Ely's book, *Belief and Creed*, are distinguished only by being printed in italics. As a rule, each quotation is followed by a reference to the page from which it is taken.

THE LETTER AND THE SPIRIT

CHAPTER I

SYMBOLICAL INTERPRETATION

THE question at issue, which deeply concerns a large body of Churchmen, is not the general question whether the symbolical interpretation of any clauses in the Creed is legitimate. That was settled long ago, when men began consciously to repeat the words "He descended into hell" in a metaphorical sense, and when the compilers of the English Prayer Book substituted "the resurrection of the body" for "the resurrection of the flesh" in the Creeds. It is admitted on all sides that three clauses are, and must be, now understood in a sense different from that which they bore in the first five centuries. The question for us is more definite. Is it permissible for those who recite the Apostles' Creed to give a symbolical interpretation to the two clauses "Born of the Virgin Mary" and "He rose again (*i.e.* in the flesh) from the dead"?

In order to answer that question satisfactorily we must first answer three other questions which are involved in it.

(1) Are those two clauses essentially different in

character from the others which have long been understood in a metaphorical sense?

(2) Is the evidence for the statements which they contain so convincing that a reasonable man should not hesitate to accept them in the literal sense?

(3) When and under what conditions is it dishonest to join in affirmations of which only parts are understood literally?

(1) The clauses of the Apostles' and of the Nicene Creed may be divided into two classes. Some are definitions or descriptions; and these, the late Bishop of Oxford has said, "are inadequate and only symbolically true." [1] Others are statements about events happening in time, past or future, which are commonly described as "historical facts." In one sense all the clauses of this latter class also are symbolical. For their importance ultimately depends upon their representing or guaranteeing some spiritual truth. If they did not do this, no one would care to recite them. Now a narrative which is not historical, in the sense of recording an actual event, may be representative of a spiritual truth: and there have been cases in which a narrative, once supposed to be historical, has been retained in a place of honour, as representative of a spiritual truth, by generations which did not believe it to be literally true. The Bishop of Ely has himself described how this change took place with regard to the clause "He ascended into heaven":

The meaning of the terms in question, so far as

[1] *Constructive Quarterly*, March 1914, p. 54.

it has ever changed, has changed gradually, and there is no evidence, so far as I know, that at any stage there had ever been any controversy, or anything of conscious unveracity on the part of those who used them (*Belief and Creed*, p. 46).

Is there any reason why the process of change, thus described, should be legitimate with regard to certain historical clauses, and illegitimate with regard to others? If there is such a reason, it must rest upon some principle according to which the historical clauses can be divided into two groups. Can we discover any such principle? Only one, so far as I know, has been suggested. Bishop Gore draws a distinction in the following manner. The same principle of interpretation which is applied to the theological clauses "must be applied to all that lies outside our present human experience," such as the Creation and the Descent into Hell. But "Born of the Virgin Mary," like "He was crucified," lies within our possible or actual human experience, and therefore it must be treated as a plain statement of an objective fact. If we ask how he knows that such an event is within possible or actual human experience, the answer is ready:

"Though we do not know wholly how a natural birth of a child occurs, we can describe it in sufficiently accurate language. And though we do not know wholly how the birth of a child from a virgin mother would take place, we can describe the event with the same definiteness." [1]

[1] *Constructive Quarterly*, March 1914, p. 64.

This is nothing but a revival of the old fallacy, against which our early logic lessons used to warn us, that conceivability is the test of truth. The Greeks had a very clear conception of centaurs, and their artists made very lifelike representations of them. Does it follow that such creatures are within our actual or possible experience? Countless pictures on glass and canvas assure us that for sixteen centuries the Church had a very definite conception of the manner in which our Lord ascended into heaven; and yet Bishop Gore himself (in the article already quoted) tells us that "heaven is not really a locality above our heads," so that what (according to the Acts) the disciples witnessed was only a symbolic act.

Unless, therefore, some firmer ground for a distinction can be discovered, we have no more right to speak of the Virgin Birth as "within human experience" than of the Ascent into Heaven. The extant evidence for both miracles is practically the same—an early tradition which is preserved in the Creed and in two passages of the New Testament. Both alike are so completely outside actual human experience that they call for exceptionally strong evidence, which is not forthcoming. Both alike may be plausibly explained as natural products of the mental atmosphere of the early Church. Both alike have always been understood to represent important spiritual truths. Therefore, if one of them admits of symbolical interpretation, surely so does the other. If a distinction is to be made between them in that respect, the Virgin Birth has

less claim than the Ascension to literal acceptance: for, whereas nothing in the New Testament contravenes the latter, there are several passages which, if naturally interpreted, throw doubt upon the former.

Bishop Gore's test, therefore, fails; and no other has been proposed. There may be excellent reasons for disallowing the symbolical interpretation of the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection of the Flesh: but they must be independent of any assumption that these two miracles are within, while the Descent into Hell and the Ascension into Heaven are without, possible or actual human experience.

(2) Our second question can be answered more briefly. Is the evidence for these miracles so convincing that a reasonable man should not hesitate to accept them in the literal sense? The Bishop of Ely has himself supplied a clear answer. About the Virgin Birth he writes (p. 78), "*The evidence is slight.*" And his opinion of the evidence for the Resurrection of the Flesh is made quite clear (*B. and C.* pp. 137–141), when he substitutes for the traditional view a theory of Bishop Westcott's which, as I shall show,[1] cannot be reconciled either with the Creeds or with the Gospel narratives, or with the writings of the earliest Fathers of the Church. On his authority, therefore, we are entitled to answer the question in the negative.

(3) In seeking an answer to the third question it seems convenient to start from a set of facts

[1] See *infra*, pp. 123–125.

which are practically undisputed among instructed Christians.

The clause in the Creed which tells of the Ascension was, as we have seen, deprived of its literal meaning long ago, but in such a way as to bring out more clearly the rich spiritual meaning which was always implicit therein. The millions of Christians who now treat it as a symbol are not doing it dishonour. They recognise, indeed, that a beautiful story, created by the dramatic instinct which is so large an element in popular piety, was welcomed by an unscientific generation, and accepted as literal truth. But they see also that for ages that story served, not unworthily, to enshrine the mystery which it appeared to reveal. And now that they know it to be only a shrine, they still maintain it in a place of honour, as a consecrated symbol of a reality which cannot be unveiled for mortal eyes. It is that mysterious reality, not any outward form, which has in all ages been the true object of faith. And yet there remain in most countries a considerable number of simple believers, whose astronomy is for all practical purposes that of the first century, and in whose eyes the physical ascension is the support and guarantee of the spiritual truth. To such the old pictures give perfect satisfaction, and raise no questionings. So we have as members of the same Church, and often worshipping side by side in the same congregation, representatives of three distinct modes of religious thought:

(*a*) Those who honestly understand the words in their original sense.

(β) Those who, like the Bishop of Ely, believe the statement to be literally true up to (say) a hundred yards from the earth's surface, but beyond that point interpret it symbolically.[1]

(γ) The majority of Christians, at least in Protestant countries, who are conscious or unconscious symbolists, repeating the clause without misgiving as a beautiful image of a truth which no human language can adequately express.[2]

Strange though it may seem, such a grouping of diverse elements is almost inevitable in an ordinary congregation. For our generation is the heir of all the Christian ages, and includes representatives of every historic mode of Christian thought; who yet hold, value, and try to rule their lives by, the truth for which the narrative stands. The situation, it may plausibly be argued, is unstable and logically indefensible: for whereas these various classes of men are bound together by a common faith, the bond would be broken if some were openly to reject the statement of "historical fact" upon which to others that faith appears to depend.

Here is a very serious practical problem. Shall it be solved by logic or by love? Logic would insist that the symbolists, whether of class (α) or (β), must (as the German proverb puts it) "empty out the child with the bath." For the sake of avoiding

[1] See *infra*, pp. 38, 39.

[2] There are also a few good people, of whom the Bishop of Chelmsford has recently made himself the spokesman, who do not see that they are contradicting themselves when they say that obviously such clauses were never meant to be understood literally, and therefore there is no symbolism in treating them symbolically!

a minor inaccuracy, they must destroy a practical union which is both real and valuable! Common sense and common charity have dictated another answer, which has been generally accepted by the symbolists. They are content to use the old formulas in the new sense, neither concealing nor obtruding their own interpretation.

When they act thus, are they doing a wrong either to themselves or to others? That must be considered.

A man wrongs himself, and (what is far more) does wrong in the sight of God, if he consciously acts in a way which is disingenuous. Whether the course in question is disingenuous or not depends largely upon the character of his mind. The more poetical and sympathetic among us can use symbolic speech without affectation; the few who are quite prosaic are unable to do so. It depends also upon his definite belief in the religious truth which the statement is understood by all to represent. If he possesses both faith and imagination, he does no harm to himself by using symbolic language.

A man wrongs others in such a matter only if he either tries to deceive them as to his views or aggressively insists upon the differences which divide him from them. For his neighbours have no right to demand that he shall use words in the particular sense which they approve; but they have a right to resent any attempt on his part to impose a new interpretation, or to emphasise distinctions among those who worship together.

If any should ask why I have stated the case from

the side of the symbolist rather than of the literalist, I would refer them to St. Paul's treatment of a somewhat similar problem.[1] When he discussed the quarrel between those who ate meat and those who abstained, it was from "the strong"—the liberals like himself who ate meat—that he demanded concessions, not from "the weak," the traditionalists. He thus established a precedent which is valid to-day: for in all such disputes it is only the strong who can yield. Those whom the Apostle would call the weak cannot be asked to make concessions, but only to exercise charity—"Who art thou, that judgest the servant of another?"[2] Can we not fancy St. Paul addressing us in words very like those which he wrote to the Romans?

"Let not then your good be evil spoken of: for the kingdom of God is not symbolism or literalism, but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost. . . . the faith which thou hast, have thou to thyself before God. Happy is he that judgeth not himself in that which he approveth."[3]

In these last four pages we have been giving reasons which appear to most Churchmen to justify an established practice—the symbolic interpretation of one clause in the Creed. We have now to inquire whether the same reasons justify a similar practice with regard to two other clauses. If the argument of pages 2–5 is sound, no valid distinction has been

[1] 1 Cor. x. 23–33; Rom. xiv. [2] Rom. xiv. 4.
[3] Rom. xiv. 16, 17, 22.

drawn between different "historical clauses"; and it follows that, *mutatis mutandis*, the principle of interpretation which has long been accepted for "He ascended into heaven," may be applied to "Born of the Virgin Mary," and "He rose again from the dead." So we seem to find a clear answer to our original question. It is permissible for those who recite the Apostles' Creed to interpret those two clauses symbolically, so long as they hold to the spiritual truths which those clauses represent.

Although I am confident that the Bishop of Ely cannot consistently refuse his consent to the main propositions of the last few pages, he would seem to be committed by repeated statements in his book to repudiate the application which has been made of them in the last paragraph. And yet I am not without hope that, in the end, he may admit the force of my contention. I may indulge that hope without presumption, because he has himself laid down a principle which would justify a much greater *divergence between belief and creed*[1] than any which liberal Churchmen have desired to see permitted.

On certain Sundays in the year he joins, though (he tells us) *with intensely keen distress*,[2] in reciting the anathemas of the Athanasian Creed, which are as follows:

"Whosoever will be saved, before all things it is necessary that he hold the Catholic Faith."

"Which Faith, except everyone do keep whole and undefiled, without doubt he shall perish everlastingly."

[1] *Belief and Creed*, p. 173. [2] *B. and C.*, p. 168.

" And they that have done good shall go into life everlasting, and they that have done evil into everlasting fire."

" This is the Catholic Faith, which except a man believe faithfully, he cannot be saved."

Too learned and too honest to countenance the absurd pretence that the words do not mean what they say, he defends himself for reciting them, though he does not believe them to be true, by urging three excuses:

(*A*) *The clauses of the Quicunque in question do not belong to the credal portion of that document: in character they answer to the anathema of the Nicene Creed.*

(*B*) *Everyone in reciting these clauses makes some kind of qualification.*

(*C*) *Those who have been most conscious of the difficulty have consistently made every effort to obtain relief from the recitation of these " warning clauses " in public worship* (*B. and C.*, pp. 168, 169).

Although the third of these pleas is that to which I wish to draw attention, it cannot fully be understood without some previous observations upon the other two. They shall be as brief as possible.

As to (*A*) there are two points which must be mentioned. The ordinary reader, who understands " the Nicene Creed " to mean the creed which forms part of the Communion service, would naturally infer from the Bishop's language that there was an anathema attached to it which has been omitted in common use as not being essential. But the fact

is [1] that what we commonly call the Nicene Creed is really a creed which came into use at Constantinople towards the end of the fourth century, and was confirmed with (some small changes) by the Council of Chalcedon in A.D. 451. It was almost certainly originally a baptismal creed, supplemented by some phrases from the Creed of Nicaea, and, like other baptismal creeds, never had an anathema. The Nicene Creed, on the other hand, was adopted by the Council of Nicaea in A.D. 325, as a test of orthodoxy for bishops,[2] and, like all such formulas, included an anathema which was never omitted. It runs thus :

" But those who say, there once was when He was not, and before He was begotten He was not, and that He came into being out of what was not, or allege that the Son of God is of alien substance or essence, or created, or capable of change or turning, them the Catholic and Apostolic Church anathematises."

The resemblance of the " warning clauses " of the Quicunque to this anathema, far from lessening its importance, emphasises its intolerance in two ways. For it reminds us that during the fourth and three following centuries, which produced a series of Symbols (creeds) with anathemas,[3] the Church believed intensely that there could be no

[1] This fact is recognised on page 51 of *B. and C.*

[2] See C. H. Turner, *Use of Creeds and Anathemas in the Early Church* (S.P.C.K.).

[3] Hahn's *Symbole und Glaubensregeln* contains some fifty of these pronouncements, each with an anathema.

salvation without orthodox belief. And if we compare the Athanasian anathema with the Nicene, we cannot but recognise how much the later excels the earlier in severity and in definiteness.

Secondly it is impossible to read the Quicunque impartially without recognising that the anathemas are an essential part of it. They are, in fact, the text, upon which the credal part is commentary.

As to (*B*) I am again obliged to differ from the Bishop. Even if he were right in claiming that no one really believes these "warnings" to be true, that would be a singular argument to put forward in favour of reciting them. But he is not right. I have in my possession a pamphlet entitled *For God and for China*, published in 1917. The author, Mr. Stanley P. Smith, complains that he was dismissed from the service of the China Inland Mission because he refused to teach "that all the ancestors of the Chinese have gone to an endless hell." And he quotes letters from the authorities of that Mission to the effect that this doctrine is an essential part of the Gospel.

I recall, too, the words of a Cambridge undergraduate, spoken to me some ten years ago when he was shortly to be ordained as a missionary. "It would not be worth my while," he said, "to make the sacrifice of going to Africa, unless I were sure that, without the knowledge I can give, they must all suffer eternal fire." The speaker was neither stupid nor insane, but a man of good character and ability. Only he had been brought up in one of those circles where there still lingers the

religious atmosphere of those early centuries which produced the anathemas and those later ages which invented the Inquisition.

(*C*) In the light of the above remarks we can better judge what is the bearing of the Bishop's third and most surprising plea. The principle which it assumes, as if it were something quite obvious, may be stated in plain words thus: If a man has made public his objections to a particular clause in a creed, and has done his best to get it amended or omitted, he can then without any breach of good faith continue to join in reciting it. That plea not only endorses the claim of liberal Churchmen, but goes far beyond it. For whereas we always insist that a man may not repeat a clause in a symbolical sense unless he sincerely holds to the spiritual sense which it bears for all Christians, in the case of these anathemas it is exactly the spiritual sense which the Bishop renounces. He is not one of those survivals from the dark ages who believe God capable of condemning to endless torment all the millions who have never heard the name of Christ, or even professing Christians who are guilty of intellectual error in their faith. Just because he shares the higher conception of God's nature which has gradually taken possession of the modern mind, he refuses assent to a statement which involves what he feels to be blasphemy, since it pronounces the character of God to be something far below that of an ordinary good man. Such a statement, if accepted by us, would be more important than any other clause in the Creed: for it must transform our whole con-

ception of God's nature and providence, and of the meaning of Christ's manifestation to the world. Compared with the question whether God is love or is capable of infinite and deliberate injustice, questions about the mode and attendant circumstances of our Lord's Incarnation and Resurrection are of quite secondary importance. If the Bishop permits himself to join in reciting the Athanasian anathemas, which are in essence a denial of God's goodness, while his heart affirms that goodness to be the foundation upon which all faith rests, what reasonable ground has he for disputing the honesty of the symbolist? This is a question not only for one bishop, but for the whole Church. The Church of England stands alone in requiring all her members to recite the Athanasian anathemas. The Church of England, therefore, has surely less right than any other Church to condemn those who, when they recite certain words of the Apostles' Creed, understand them not to be literal statements of fact, but apt and consecrated symbols of religious truths.

Perhaps some readers may be inclined to ask, If the difficulties are so great, why should the Creeds be recited in our services at all? The Church did very well without them for more than four centuries. Till near the end of the fifth century the only approach to a creed as part of worship was the Te Deum, which is a hymn of praise modelled upon such psalms as "In exitu Israel." Towards A.D. 500 the "Nicene" creed was introduced into the liturgy at Antioch and Constantinople; and the practice of reciting it gradually spread over Europe. The

similar use of the Apostles' Creed began a good deal later. No doubt, in an age when orthodoxy was of more account than faith, it was largely as a test of orthodoxy that this practice originated. But there are phrases in the "Nicene" Creed which have the genuine ring of devotion, so that it could be placed beside the Te Deum as a hymn. And although through many centuries the recital of the Creeds has been treated (as the Bishop of Ely treats it) mainly as a profession of orthodoxy, still during the last fifty years men have been returning to the older and more religious conception of Creeds as hymns of praise. Just for that reason they have become more critical of the language which is put into their mouths. This return to the older and more religious attitude is admirably described by some words of Professor Bethune-Baker's, which I venture to quote:

"The purpose of a Creed is not to profess knowledge, but to declare faith. Faith is on a different plane from knowledge; and the intention of the Creed is not to state 'historical facts' or events, but the religious convictions of the Society, and the individual who makes the convictions of the Society his own. . . . It has never been belief in the mere fact that counted as the individual's faith, guaranteeing him the fellowship of the Church on earth and in heaven, but always the meaning which it had for him, the inferences he drew from it, the opinions connected with it which he held, or was supposed to hold. . . . Yet the Creeds we have inherited are so ill-fitted for the purpose of expressing clearly the essential convictions (whether in-

tellectual or spiritual) of a Christian, that the use of them in public worship is one of the reasons why some of those who are most Christian in mind and will are not found in our churches at all. In these circumstances the Creeds cannot retain the authority which is often claimed for them." [1]

This consideration carries us back to the old contrast, so obvious in the New Testament, between "faith" and "*the* faith." In the great epistles of St. Paul "faith" is represented as an attitude of love and trust and reverence towards God, which is the inspiration of the Christian life. In the Pastoral epistles we find "*the* faith" described as a deposit to be guarded, a form of sound words to be held fast.[2] No one who compares the spiritual climates of Romans and of the epistles to Timothy can hesitate to say which is the purer. The one is evangelical, the other ecclesiastical: and it is the evangelical which is characteristic of St. Paul. A student of his writings, who was also a notable philosopher, wrote in 1877:

"The practical Christian faith is thoroughly one with itself. It is not in it, but in the current theological conception of it, that there lies the contradiction of which I have previously spoken. An assent to propositions upon evidence is not an intrinsic element in it, nor that on which it ultimately depends. Its object is not past events, but a present, reconciled, and indwelling God. . . . It is no doubt historically conditioned, but it is not on

[1] Bethune-Baker, *The Faith of the Apostles' Creed*, pp. 32, 33.
[2] 1 Tim. vi. 3; 2 Tim. i. 12, 13; Titus ii. 7, 10.

an intellectual estimate of its own conditions that it depends for being what it is. Without the Christian tradition it would not have been what it is: but a judgment as to the authenticity of that tradition, though it has hitherto followed from it almost as a matter of course, is not essential to it as a spiritual state." [1]

Here is the real issue, upon which I entreat the reader to concentrate his attention. Which is to be the watchword of the Church of England—the spirit or the letter? "The spirit of adoption, whereby we cry Abba, Father," or "the form of sound words" which was framed to meet the intellectual conditions of the primitive Church? Are we to return to the attitude of the fourth century when orthodoxy was more esteemed than character, conduct, or spiritual gifts? Or shall the Church of England maintain the tradition of intellectual freedom and tolerance which has been one of her noblest characteristics ever since the Reformation? There is a real danger that she may lose that fine tradition. For a large and well-organised party among the clergy are urging the bishops to silence or excommunicate the many thousands of loyal Churchmen who, yielding to none in their devotion to Christ's divine person, do not believe that the fourth century has said the last word about the conditions under which He was manifested to the world. Whatever weakness there may be in my presentation of their case, they are not, as a body,

[1] T. H. Green, sermon on "Faith," delivered to his pupils at Balliol in 1877. Printed in his collected works.

either ignorant or superficial. Among them are numbered Dr. Sanday and other eminent clerical scholars, and laymen, such as Professor Percy Gardner, who have more theological learning than nine-tenths of the clergy. They number men and women who are living pure and unselfish lives, devoted to the service of the Church which they love. If they are banned or alienated, the loss to the Church will not be less than it suffered when Wesley and his flock were driven into the wilderness by the episcopal ineptitude which it is now the fashion to lament. As I have already said, they do not deny any articles of the Creed, but only decline to affirm some of them in the literal sense: still less do they seek to impose their own interpretation upon others, for they desire to live and worship in brotherly concord with all who can say from their hearts that Jesus is the Lord.[1] They are anxious to learn, very ready to hear reasons and examine evidence. But mere authority, whether of numbers or of office, will not coerce them.

[1] 1 Cor. xii. 3.

CHAPTER II

ACCEPTED SYMBOLISM

I venture therefore to say that a study of St. Paul's actual words shows that there is no contradiction between his teaching and the article of the Creed—"the resurrection of the flesh" (*B. and C.* p. 40).

The argument (pp. 38–40) which leads up to this conclusion is so insubstantial that there is hardly a definite point to take hold of. But there are two remarks which are perhaps worth making.

(*a*) The Bishop seems to have missed the bearing of 1 Cor. xv. 39–41. These verses are a parenthesis, like 29–34, and rather interfere with the sequence of thought. When St. Paul had written (verse 28) "God giveth it a body . . . and to each seed a body of its own," it naturally occurred to him to point out that the variety of creation was not limited to the vegetable world, but equally conspicuous in the animal and the celestial worlds. So he turns aside for a moment. Having used the word "body" somewhat improperly for plants, he had to find another word for animals, and took the obvious one "flesh." Each word is evidently meant to cover both substance and form. A similar difficulty occurred when he came to celestial bodies. There he compromised, using partly "body" and partly "glory"—all three words, body, flesh, glory,

are used to express at once the substance, the form, and the beauty of objects in the vegetable, animal, and celestial spheres. To argue from such a highly poetical use in a single passage that "flesh" and "body" are seriously to be treated as synonyms is to show little appreciation of St. Paul's style.

(*b*) Still more surprising is the contention that because "*we may speak of the accession of Richard Duke of Gloucester or of the accession of King Richard the Third*," we may therefore speak indifferently "*of the resurrection of the flesh or of the resurrection of the spiritual body*." In the one case there is a new name for a person who is unchanged, and whose accession depends upon his remaining unchanged; in the other case, if we may believe St. Paul, there are two objects which, though intimately connected, belong to different spheres of being. The parallel which is drawn between the two cases is so inappropriate as to be positively grotesque.

But the statement with which this chapter begins may be considered apart from the reasons which are urged in its favour. Let us place side by side for comparison some of St. Paul's actual words and three or four passages which show how the Church in different centuries has understood the phrase "the resurrection of the flesh." St. Paul's view is sufficiently expressed in two verses:

"Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of heaven" (1 Cor. xv. 50).

"For we know that, if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of

God, an house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens" (2 Cor. v. 1).

Irenaeus (A.D. 117–195), who composed an elaborate refutation of all heresies towards the end of the second century, writes thus:

"All those who are enrolled for life shall rise again, *having their own bodies*, having also their own souls and their own spirits, in which they pleased God. Those, on the other hand, who are worthy of punishment shall go away into it, they too having their own souls *and their own bodies, in which* they revolted from the grace of God. Both classes shall cease from any further begetting or being begotten, from marrying and being given in marriage." [1]

These words make it perfectly clear that Irenaeus, representing the orthodoxy of his time, did not think of the soul passing from one body to another of a different kind, but of the reconstitution of the actual earthly body in its completeness. In another place Irenaeus writes:

"In the same manner, therefore, as Christ rose in the substance of the flesh, and pointed out to His disciples the marks of the nails and the opening in His side (now these prove the identity of the flesh which rose from the dead), so shall He also, it is said, raise us by His power. . . . For these are

[1] πάντες οἱ ἐγγραφέντες εἰς ζωὴν ἀναστήσονται, ἴδια ἔχοντες σώματα καὶ ἰδίας ἔχοντες ψυχάς, καὶ ἴδια πνεύματα, ἐν οἷς εὐηρέστησαν τῷ θεῷ, οἱ δὲ τῆς κολάσεως ἄξιοι ἀπελεύσονται εἰς τὴν αὐτήν, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἰδίας ἔχοντες ψυχὰς καὶ ἴδια σώματα, ἐν οἷς ἀπέστησαν ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ χάριτος. καὶ παύσονται ἑκάτεροι τοῦ γεννᾶν ἔτι καὶ γεννᾶσθαι, καὶ γαμεῖν καὶ γαμεῖσθαι. (*Heresies*, ii. 33, § 5).

It is to be observed that the neuter relative ἐν οἷς must refer to "the bodies in which they sinned." The use of the word παύσονται implies that the cessation is not due to impotence.

animal bodies, that is, partaking of animal life; and when they lose it they suffer death; then rising through the power of the Spirit they become spiritual bodies, endowed by the Spirit with never-ending life." [1]

It is obvious how closely Irenaeus is followed by the fourth article of the Church of England:

"Christ did truly rise again from death, and took again His body, with flesh, bones, and all things appertaining to the perfection of man's nature."

But we must quote another testimony from the Fathers. Origen (185–253), the most important Churchman of the third century, wrote an elaborate reply to the attack which the heathen Celsus had made upon the Christian faith, usually quoting Celsus's own words. Naturally Celsus had something to say about the resurrection.

"It is folly on their part to suppose that when God (as if He were a cook!) sets fire [to the world], all the rest of the human race will be baked to nothing, while they alone will remain, not only such as are then alive, but also those who have been long dead, these latter rising from the earth with their very own flesh. 'Tis the hope of a very worm!

[1] The original Greek of this passage has been lost; but the old Latin translation is generally quite accurate:
Quomodo igitur Christus in carnis substantia surrexit, et ostendit discipulis figuras clavorum et apertionem lateris (haec autem sunt indicia carnis ejus, quae resurrexit a mortuis) sic et nos, inquit, suscitabit per virtutem suam. . . . Haec sunt enim corpora animalia, id est participantia animae; quam quum amiserint mortificantur: deinde per Spiritum surgentia fiunt corpora spiritualia, uti per Spiritum semper permanentem habeant vitam (*Heresies*, v. 7, §§ 1, 2).

For what sort of human soul would still long for a body which had decayed? Why, even some of the Christians reject this doctrine of yours, as being abominable, repulsive, and impossible to prove. For what kind of body is that which, after being completely decayed, can return to its original nature, and to the exact constitution which it lost by corruption?" [1]

In replying to this attack Origen does not repudiate Celsus's words as an unfair description of ordinary Christian teaching; but he tacitly accepts the statement that some Christians reject that teaching, and claims that these (though few) are the truly representative body. These, he says, are the more intelligent, who have a more adequate conception of the truth:

"Celsus has elaborately ridiculed the resurrection of the flesh, which, though *it has been preached in our churches*, has been more clearly (*i.e.* truly adequately) understood by the wise." . . . "Neither we nor the Holy Scriptures assert that those who have long been dead shall rise from the earth and live in the actual flesh, nowise changed for the better." [2]

[1] ἠλίθιον δ' αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ νομίζειν, ἐπειδάν ὁ θεὸς ὥσπερ μάγειρος ἐπενέγκῃ τὸ πῦρ, τὸ μὲν ἄλλο πᾶν ἐξοπτήσεσθαι γένος, αὐτοὺς δὲ μόνους διαμενεῖν, οὐ μόνον τοὺς ζῶντας ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς πάλαι ποτὲ ἀποθανόντας, αὐταῖς σαρξὶν ἐκείναις ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ἀναδύντας, ἀτεχνῶς σκωλήκων ἡ ἐλπὶς. ποία γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ποθήσειεν ἔτι σῶμα σεσηπός; ὁπότε μηδ' ὑμῶν τοῦτο τὸ δόγμα καὶ τῶν χριστιανῶν ἐνίοις κοινόν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ σφόδρα μαρὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀπόπτυστον ἅμα καὶ ἀδύνατον ἀποφαίνειν· ποῖον γὰρ σῶμα πάντῃ διαφθαρὲν οἷόν τε ἐπανελθεῖν εἰς τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς φύσιν, καὶ αὐτὴν ἐκείνην, ἐξ ἧς ἐλύθη, τὴν πρώτην σύστασιν; (*Contra Celsum*, v. 14).

[2] ἐπεὶ δ' ἐπὶ πλέον κεκωμώδηκε τὴν κεκηρυγμένην μὲν τῆς σαρκὸς ἀνάστασιν ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν συνετωτέρων τρανότερον νενοημένην . . . οὔτε μὲν οὖν ἡμεῖς οὔτε τὰ θεῖα γράμματα αὐταῖς φησὶ σαρξὶ, μηδεμίαν μεταβολὴν ἀνειληφυίαις τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον, ζήσεσθαι τοὺς πάλαι ἀποθανόντας ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ἀναδύντας (*Contra Celsum*, v. 18).

Evidently *we* in the last sentence means the instructed Christians (*συνετώτεροι*), whose views are more elevated than those of the majority. If there were any doubt about that, it would be removed by a sentence in the following chapter. Referring to 1 Cor. xv. he writes:

"And although the apostle wished to conceal the secret meaning of the passage, *which was not adapted to the simpler class of believers*, and for popular preaching to those who are led by faith to a better life, still he was obliged (lest we should misapprehend his meaning), after saying, 'Let us bear the image of the heavenly,' to add, 'Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of heaven; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption.' Then, as became one who in his epistles was leaving to posterity words full of significance, he subjoins, 'Behold, I show you a mystery,' which is his usual manner of introducing deeper and more mystical topics, *which are properly concealed from the multitude.*" [1]

What we learn from these passages may be summed up in a few words. The great majority of Christians in the second and third centuries looked for the resurrection of the flesh in the most literal sense.

[1] *καίτοι δὲ βουλόμενος κρύπτειν ὁ ἀπόστολος τὰ κατὰ τὸν τόπον ἀπόῤῥητα καὶ μὴ ἁρμόζοντα τοῖς ἁπλουστέροις καὶ τῇ πανδήμῳ ἀκοῇ τῶν διὰ τοῦ πιστένειν ἀγομένων ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον, ὅμως ἠναγκάσθη ὕστερον ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ παρακοῦσαι ἡμᾶς τῶν λόγων αὐτοῦ εἰπεῖν, μετὰ τὸ "φορέσωμεν τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐπουρανίου," τὸ "τοῦτο δὲ φημί, ἀδελφοί, ὅτι σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα βασιλείαν θεοῦ κληρονομῆσαι οὐ δύνανται, οὐδ' ἡ φθορὰ τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν κληρονομεῖ." εἶτα . . . ὡς ἔπρεπε διὰ γραμμάτων καταλιπόντι τοῖς μετ' αὐτὸν τὰ νενοημένα εἰρημένα, ἐπιφέρει καὶ λέγει, "ἰδοὺ μυστήριον ὑμῖν λέγω"· ὅ τι περ ἔθος ἐστὶν ἐπιφέρεσθαι τοῖς βαθυτέροις καὶ μυστικωτέροις καὶ καθηκόντως ἀπὸ τῶν πολλῶν κρυπτομένοις* (*Contra Celsum*, v. 19).

Origen and other "modernists" of the Alexandrian School saw that this belief was repugnant to reason and to the higher teaching of St. Paul, and they developed St. Paul's conception of "a spiritual body." They would have had no hesitation in saying that there is a *contradiction between his teaching and the article of the Creed—"the resurrection of the flesh."* But they were a small minority, and doubted whether the higher teaching could be so presented as to be either acceptable or edifying to the majority of simple believers.

I have felt obliged to quote Origen at some length because the Bishop of Ely, relying upon what he fancied to be the meaning of a sentence taken out of its context, has brought it forward to support a charge against me. These are his words:

It is not without significance that the Canon simply revives a cavil urged by Celsus in the second century. Origen, quoting the words of St. Paul in 1 Cor. xv. as I have done, answers Celsus substantially as I have just answered the Canon. "Neither we," he writes, "nor the sacred Scriptures assert that those who died long ago shall rise again from the earth and live in the actual flesh (αὐταῖς σαρξὶ), without its undergoing a change for the better. And Celsus when he says this calumniates (συκοφαντεῖ) us."

The quotation is exact. Only, as reference to the context has demonstrated, *we* in these sentences does not mean Christians in general, but the small body of modernists (συνετώτεροι) which Origen represented. The Bishop's error illustrates the

value of the old rule which bids scholars always verify their quotations.

I will not labour the point, nor accumulate examples. I have referred to Irenaeus and Origen mainly because they had been quoted as authorities against me (*B. and C.*, pp. 40, 41, 154), but I think their evidence, properly interpreted, is quite sufficient to prove my contention.

(11) *I maintain that among Christians there has always been so clear and so all but universal a belief that God is incorporeal, that no sane Christian has ever been tempted to suppose that the clause of the Creed, "And sitteth at the right hand of God the Father Almighty"—a phrase the literary history of which goes back to Psalm cx.—implies that God the Father has a human body* (*B. and C.*, p. 41).

I must begin by pleading guilty to an inaccuracy. On pp. 77 and 78 of the manual, for the sake of brevity, I applied a single phrase—"were unquestionably believed by the early Church to be literal statements of fact"—to four clauses of the Creed. In the full sense, however, the phrase only applies to three, while of the fourth it should rather be said that "sitteth at the right hand" was believed by *many* (or most) *in* the early Church to be a literal statement of fact. I could not therefore have been surprised if the Bishop of Ely, seeking a controversial advantage, had brought up his heavy artillery of quotations to make a breach at this weak spot. He might have said with truth, "The early Church included John of Damascus, St. Augustine, and others, who certainly did not hold this

view." But the sentence quoted above goes much farther. Not content with affirming, what no one disputes, that the instructed Christians of all ages have regarded the substance of God the Father as spiritual and not material, the Bishop denies that any sane Christian ever held the view in question. Now a universal negative is sufficiently refuted by a single positive instance. I will furnish three instances, all from the mouths of the Bishop's own witnesses.

On page 44 of *B. and C.*, in the passage quoted against me from Socrates's *Historia Evangelica*, there are these words: "And in particular many of the simple ascetics held that God is corporeal and of human form; but most people condemned these men, and asserted that God is without body." Must we really deny that the simple ascetics were sane Christians? It seems a little inconsistent on the part of one who tells us that "*the heart of simple believers and their conscience often guide them to the true issue*" (*B. and C.*, p. 163).

At any rate I venture to assert that Monnica, the mother of St. Augustine, was a sane Christian. If we may believe her son's testimony, she was a model of intelligent piety. She did her best to instruct her wayward son in the true faith; and he lived much at home under her influence until he was at least twenty-one years of age. Yet this is what he tells us in his *Confessions*. When he was studying at Carthage, about the age of eighteen, he was unable to answer the arguments of the Manichaeans:

"For knowing not the true Being, I was so shaken

by quips and quiddities that I had no answer for these silly deceivers when they asked me, What is the origin of evil? Whether God is limited by a bodily form? Whether He has hair and nails? . . . I did not understand that God is a spirit, who has no parts that can be measured, whose being is not a bulk" [1] (*Confessions*, iii. 7, Biggs's translation).

At Milan, when he was about thirty-three years old, Augustine attended the preaching of St. Ambrose, who was then Bishop:

"But when I learned that the words 'man was made in Thy image' were not understood by Thy spiritual sons (whom by grace Thou hast regenerated of the Catholic mother) as signifying that Thou art limited by the form of a human body, although I could form no idea, not even by way of allegory, of the true nature of spiritual substance, yet I was both glad and ashamed to find that for all these years I had been barking, not against the Catholic faith, but against the vain devices of carnal thoughts" [2] (*Confessions*, vi. 3).

"A great hope dawned! The Catholic faith

[1] Nesciebam enim aliud, vere quod est, et quasi acutule movebar, ut suffragarer stultis deceptoribus, cum a me quaereretur, unde malum est et utrum forma corporea deus finiretur et haberet capillos et ungues, etc. . . . Non noveram deum esse spiritum, non cui membra essent per longum et latium, nec cui esse moles esset.

[2] Ubi vero etiam corperi ad imaginem tuam hominem a te factum ab spiritalibus filiis tuis, quos de matre catholica per gratiam regenerasti, non sic intelligi, ut humani corporis forma te terminatum crederent atque cogitarent, quamquam quomodo se haberet spiritalis substantia, ne quidem tenuiter atque aenigmate suspicabar, tamen gaudens erubui non me tot annos adversus catholicam fidem, sed contra carnalium cogitationum figmenta latrasse.

does not teach what I thought, what I vainly charged against her. Her doctors count it a sin to believe that God is bounded by the shape of a human body" [1] (*Confessions*, vi. 11).

The conclusion to be drawn from these passages is obvious and irresistible. Though the more highly instructed Christians (docti) did not ascribe a material human body to God, by Monnica's circle, and by Augustine's other Christian friends, the belief was so completely taken for granted that Augustine never doubted, until he heard St. Ambrose, that it was a necessary part of the Christian faith.

St. Augustine represents primarily the Latin-speaking Christians of his own generation (354–430). The Greek-speaking world were far less inclined to take the materialistic view of God's nature: and there is no difficulty in finding passages in the Greek apologists of the second century which expressly repudiate it. Therefore it is all the more remarkable that Origen in his *Principia* (*c.* A.D. 225), a dogmatic treatise written for believers, devotes the first chapter to an argument against those who ascribed a material body to God the Father, and that in his preface he mentions that argument as a main part of his task. After observing that in popular usage the word "incorporeal" had come to mean merely something made of air or gas, and therefore in fact material, while the proper sense of the word, as

[1] Magna spes oborta est. Non docet catholica fides, quod putabamus et vani accusabamus. Nefas habent docti ejus credere deum figura humani corporis terminatum.

used by the Greek philosophers, had been forgotten, he proceeds thus:

"We shall inquire, however, whether the idea which Greek philosophers express by the term *ἀσώματον* is to be found in Holy Scripture under another name. We have also to inquire how God Himself ought to be conceived—whether as corporeal and to be delineated according to some visible shape, or as having a nature differing from bodies—*a point which is certainly not made clear in our preaching*" [1] (Preface, § 9).

The first chapter is too long to quote, and no short selection can express, what appears from its whole tone, how serious Origen thought the need to be of refuting the materialists. But one sentence may be given here:

"Those who assert this [*i.e.* that the power of an intellectual nature may be a function of a material body] certainly do so to the disparagement of that better substance which is within them: nay, by so doing they even do wrong to God Himself, when they imagine He may be understood by means of a bodily nature, *so that according to their view He is a body*, and that which may be understood or perceived by means of a body" [2] (*Principia*, i. 1, § 7).

[1] The Greek original of this passage (and of most of the *Principia*) is lost. But Rufinus's Latin translation is trustworthy except where his desire to represent Origen as orthodox leads him astray. And this is plainly not such an occasion:

Quaeremus tamen si vel alio nomine res ipsa, quam graeci philosophi *ἀσώματον* (id est, incorporeum) dicunt, in sanctis scripturis invenitur. Deus quoque ipsi quomodo intelligi debet requirendum est, corporeus et secundum aliquem habitum deformatus, an alterius naturae quam corpora sunt, quod utique in praedicatione nostra manifeste non designatur.

[2] Quod qui dicunt, sine dubio in contumeliam ejus substantiae, quae in ipsis melior est, haec proferent: immo vero ex hoc etiam

These two passages, especially the words which are printed in italics, make it quite plain that in Origen's time the materialistic conception of God's nature was widespread even among Greek-speaking Christians, and was by no means limited to the ignorant and unphilosophical. Some of the arguments employed in the first chapter of the *Principia* could only be addressed to believers who were much above the ordinary level of education.

Whether, then, we allow " simple ascetics " to be sane Christians or not, the evidence of Origen and Augustine proves that in the third and fourth centuries there was a large body of Christians who believed that God the Father had a body such as is implied in the phrase " God created man in His own image " (Gen. i. 27).

(iii) With reference to the clauses " He descended into hell " and " He ascended into heaven," I am unable to discover any one sentence in *B. and C.*, pages 46 to 54, which states the Bishop's main contention in a concise form. So I must try to summarise it as plainly as I can, using several of his own phrases. It may be stated thus:

" These two clauses are admittedly now understood by all men as metaphorical or symbolical. And even earlier, *when no one held the Copernican theory, men used the terms ascend and descend as at least in part metaphor* (*a*). For instance, when ' descended from heaven ' is used by St. John (iii. 13) to describe the Incarnation, *the thought is not spatial*

ad ipsum deum refertur injuria, cum putant eum per naturam corpoream possi intelligi vel sentiri; quo scilicet secundum ipsos corpus sit, et illud, quod per corpus potest intellegi vel sentiri.

but mystical (*β*). Therefore 'came down from heaven' in the Nicene Creed *was not in any literal sense spatial* (*γ*). Now 'ascended into heaven' and 'descended' are several times used as correlatives. Therefore *the literal meaning of the correlative clause* 'ascended into heaven,' in the Nicene Creed, *was not of the essence of this confession of the Christian Faith* (*δ*). Therefore *there is no analogy between a man saying of our Lord that He descended into hell, He ascended into heaven, without believing that heaven is a place above our heads and hell a place beneath our feet, and on the other hand, a man saying of our Lord that He 'was conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary,' without believing that the Lord was born of a Virgin.*"

Upon the main lines of this argument, which are marked (*α*), (*β*), (*γ*), (*δ*), there are a few observations to be made.

(*α*) Professor Bethune-Baker's book entitled *The Faith of the Apostles' Creed,* which was published a few days before *B. and C.*, gave by anticipation a complete answer to several of the arguments which are put forward in the latter. The reader would do well to study pages 116–34 of that admirable statement. Here I may be allowed to quote a few sentences which bear upon this first point:

"He descended into hell. No ingenuity can disguise the fact that in its literal sense this clause expresses a belief which Christians do not hold to-day. It is not simply a case of words having lost their original sense and come to be mere figures of speech, or of an archaic view of the universe such as is reflected in other clauses of the Creed.

'Hell' does nor represent to English ears merely the state of the dead; nor did 'Hades' and 'the infernal regions' represent, in Greek and Latin respectively, merely the state of the dead, to those who first inserted the clause in Creeds. The vast majority of Christians who have used the Apostles' Creed as the statement of their own beliefs have understood that our Lord, after death, actually passed to the place where the Devil rules over the lost, or 'damned,' or 'the spirits which were detained in prison'; and they have not always understood that He went there as the Conqueror of death and the Devil" (p. 116).

After sketching the history of this belief, which is first clearly stated by Justin Martyr and Irenaeus, and quoting some picturesque phrases from fourth-century creeds, the author continues:

"It is not the Death with which either of these early exponents of the Creed connects it, but the Burial; and the dramatic language of the Greek Creeds just cited shows that a definite and conscious experience after death was intended to be understood. Moreover, against Apollinaris, who denied that our Lord had a human rational soul, the belief in the Descent was constantly appealed to as evidence of our Lord's complete manhood by orthodox writers of the fourth century and later, and it has a place in the Athanasian Creed, which is specially concerned to contradict all theories of an Apollinarian tendency. The strength of the argument at this time of course depended on the belief that the Descent into Hell was as real an event, as 'historical' an incident, as the Birth, the Crucifixion, or the Burial" (pp. 123, 124).

These words of the Lady Margaret Professor, as the candid reader will see at once, completely dispose of the contention that "ascend" and "descend" were always used *as at least in part metaphor.*

(β) *The thought of this passage is not spatial but mystical.* These words refer in the first instance to St. John iii. 13, "No man hath ascended into heaven but He that descended out of heaven, even the Son of man (which is in heaven)"; but in the second place also to those verses of the sixth chapter of St. John which speak of Christ as coming down from heaven, *e.g.* "I am come down from heaven," and "This is the bread which cometh down out of heaven" (vi. 38, 50).

From iii. 13 the Bishop rightly infers that the words "ascend" and "descend" are correlative terms, so that if one is used mystically or metaphorically, we may presume that so is the other. He assumes without proof, and I think without reason, that in the sixth chapter "descend" is *plainly figurative*: and concludes that therefore in St. John iii. 13, and in the Nicene Creed, "descend" is not spatial but mystical, and consequently the correlative "ascend" is also mystical.

If the words at the end of iii. 13, "which is in heaven," were a genuine part of the text they would support the mystical interpretation. Bishop Westcott and so many scholars regard them as an early gloss (second century) that the Bishop of Ely does not claim them as genuine. But he very strangely brings forward this gloss, and the exaggerations of it which are found in St. Augustine, Cyril

of Alexandria, and Leo the Great, as indications of what St. John ought to have thought, and therefore probably did think. No doubt the early Church did gradually develop a love of so-called mystical paradox, which in the age of Augustine (who seems to have been the first to popularise it) amounted to a serious intellectual disease. But to quote Fathers who wrote three centuries later as proofs that though St. John did not write the phrase it must have expressed his beliefs, is rather a startling anachronism. For my own part I prefer to interpret St. John by his own writings and those of St. Paul, whose disciple he was. Now St. Paul (Eph. iv. 9) writes thus: "Now this, He ascended, what is it but that He also descended into the lower parts of the earth?" Here "ascended" and "descended" are plainly (to use the Bishop's phrase) correlative; and therefore if one is used in a literal sense the other is also to be taken literally. There can be no question of "descended" being anything but literal: therefore we must understand "ascended" literally too. St. Paul's usage does not prove a corresponding use by St. John: but it establishes a presumption in favour of such a use. Let us turn to St. John xx. 17: "Touch Me not, for I am not yet ascended unto the Father, but go unto My brethren and say unto them, I ascend unto My Father and your Father, and My God and your God." However we interpret these words, they indisputably imply that the distinction between earth and heaven is not mystical but spatial. Happily I am able to quote the Bishop in con-

firmation of this view. For in criticising a suggestion which I once made that by these words the Evangelist indicated his dissent from the popular realism of St. Luke's account of the Ascension, he insists that these words prove that St. John, like St. Luke, believed in a thoroughly spatial Ascension :

The fourth Evangelist could not conceivably have represented our Lord as saying these last words unless he himself believed that there was such a real event as the Ascension, and that it was separate from and subsequent to the Resurrection (*B. and C.*, p. 192).

Since the Bishop has supplied the answer to his own contention about the meaning of "ascend," the conclusion is obvious. If "ascend" and "descend" are correlatives, and ascend is used in a spatial sense, it follows that "descend" must also imply the "*thought of a journey from heaven to earth, of a descent through space*" (*B. and C.*, p. 51).

(γ) From this it follows naturally that the use of "ascend" and "descend" in the Nicene Creed, which the Bishop assumes to be directly derived from St. John's Gospel, is also spatial. And therefore we are unable to admit the statement that "*Plainly the words, Who . . . came down from heaven are mystical and not in any literal sense spatial*" (*B. and C.*, p. 51).

(δ) From exactly the same reasoning it follows that in the Nicene Creed the correlative clause, "ascended into heaven," is to be understood in its literal sense.

And now it seems time to return to the Apostles'

Creed, which is the real subject of debate. I would remind the reader that the greater part of the argument summarised on pages 32, 33, has only an indirect bearing upon the question at issue; which is not whether a possible mystical sense of one clause in the Nicene Creed is evidence for a corresponding mystical sense of another clause, but what there is in common between the two interpretations placed upon "descended into hell" and "ascended into heaven" by Christians of the fourth and twentieth centuries when they recite the Apostles' Creed. The reader who does not allow his attention to be distracted by a discussion which, however interesting, is largely irrelevant, will find only one answer—that given in *The Faith of a Modern Churchman* (p. 77). These clauses, "which were unquestionably believed by the early Church to be literal statements of fact, are now regarded by Churchmen of all schools as purely symbolical; because modern knowledge has made their literal truth inconceivable to educated men."

Yet those last words must be qualified in the case of Bishop Westcott and some of his disciples, who have invented what I venture to call a new heresy with regard to the Ascension. The long statement of their position which is given in an Additional Note (*B. and C.*, pp. 185–98) may be summarised thus: "The statement, He ascended into heaven, is to be regarded as literally true up to (say) a hundred yards from the earth's surface, and beyond that as symbolical." Stripped of verbiage, that is what the Bishop of Ely puts forward as the orthodox

belief. He goes further, for he professes much indignation because I ventured in a sermon to protest against this view, as ascribing to our Lord a histrionic behaviour which is quite inconsistent with the tenor of His recorded actions. I might have added that the Bishop's interpretation of St. Luke's narrative makes the latter appear to be in the full sense docetic. To present this interpretation nakedly to the reader is condemnation enough, so I will not pursue the subject. But I would invite attention to the contrast between this view and that which is presented in Professor Bethune-Baker's book:

"The appearances of the Risen Lord came to an end. The experience lasted long enough to prove what was to be proved, and 'nothing shall prove twice what once was proved.' The Ascension was the disciples' interpretation of the cessation of the Appearances and the special character of one of them. The words 'ascent' and 'session,' which most of the Christians of the past took literally, convey the same religious meaning when, in this connexion, they have become 'mere' metaphors; but we still have to ask what it is that we mean by them when we have abandoned the idea of any corporeal transference or locomotion, or figurative and illusory transaction analogous to bodily levitation of any kind. . . . The faith we affirm is the faith that our Lord in His perfected manhood passed away from sight to the immediate presence of the Father. We bring our faith into relation to the whole of His human experience in His life on earth. By the words 'He ascended into heaven and sitteth on the right hand of God the Father Almighty' we mean to declare our belief in the triumphant disci-

pline through which He passed (cf. Heb. v. 8), and the completeness of the victory which the world regarded as defeat. And, as we regard Him as the representative of man, in the victory He won we see the promise of the ascent of redeemed Humanity to God, and the surety of the fulfilment of the Divine purpose in the creation of Man."—*The Faith of the Apostles' Creed*, pp. 133–4.

CHAPTER III

THE VIRGIN BIRTH

THE third chapter of *B. and C.* begins with a complaint that "those whom the Canon represents" do not examine the familiar arguments which are once more to be stated there. If there has been such omission, I will endeavour to repair it. The task is not beyond moderate powers, for the Bishop himself sums up the result of his arguments, both the familiar ones and those which he has adduced for the first time, by saying, "*The case of the Lord's Virgin Birth is different. Here the evidence is slight*" (*B. and C.*, p. 78).

(1) *When we compare the two versions of the story of the Lord's birth, it must be allowed that, though the discrepancies between them are often exaggerated, it is not easy to harmonise them. But the difficulty caused by the variations between them is only serious to those, whether defendants or assailants of their historical character, who postulate the inerrancy of the Gospels in matters of detail. They do not appear, either in magnitude or in character, to be other than we should naturally expect in the case of two independent writers who edited different accounts of events which had taken place more than sixty years earlier, and who had themselves no personal or complete knowledge of the facts,*

and, when they wrote, were probably far from those who could assist them.

As a criticism of my statement that "the narratives in St. Matthew and St. Luke are barely reconcilable," the first of these sentences is all I could wish: for it means exactly the same thing. The rest of the paragraph, suggesting that the differences do not preclude the supposition that the two narratives had a common origin in some real incident, does not contravene anything which I wrote or suggested: so there is nothing there which requires examination. Nor again need I "examine" the criticisms of a book by Professor Lobstein and of an article by Professor Usener, neither of which I had even read when my manual was composed.

(2) With respect to the two genealogies given by St. Matthew and St. Luke, it is said that *their real significance lay in this, that they guaranteed our Lord's legal position as "Son of David."* I confess that the use of such an argument surprises me. The difficulty about "examining" it, as I am challenged to, is that its grotesque implications can hardly be exposed without the risk of being charged with irreverence. But I must accept the risk, and point out the real meaning of the argument. "Our Lord took advantage of the Jewish and Roman laws, which legitimated all children born in wedlock (whether the husband was the real father or not) in order to establish a claim to reverence as *the heir of the royal house.*" To what the Bishop says about the influence which that claim must have had upon the minds of the Jews, I cordially assent. But how

does that bear upon his argument? Surely the influence of the claim would not be less if it were true, and not based on a legal fiction.

To the passages which the Bishop quotes as showing the importance of the claim three more may be added.

St. Peter (Acts ii. 30, 32) spoke of Jesus as the Messiah whom God had sworn to David that He would raise up *of the fruit of his loins.*

St. Paul (Acts xiii. 23), speaking at Antioch of Pisidia, used similar words. "*Of this man's* [*i.e.* David's] *seed* hath God, according to His promise, raised unto Israel a Saviour, Jesus."

St. Paul again, writing to the Roman Church, affirmed that Jesus Christ (Messiah) "*was made of the seed of David according to the flesh.*"

Is it possible to find any form of words which could more definitely express literal descent in the ordinary course of generation, excluding any recourse to a legal fiction, than do the three phrases which are printed in italics? How could it be more clearly shown that the Apostles St. Peter and St. Paul believed Jesus to be in the full natural sense the Son of David? The first two passages are all the more remarkable as coming from the pen of St. Luke. If, as the Bishop of Ely has somewhere maintained, the Acts were written before the third Gospel, it would be open to any one to suggest that St. Luke did not become acquainted with the story of the Nativity until after his earlier work was published. But in any case his report of St. Paul's words must carry great weight.

(3) With regard to the Epistle to the Romans, the Bishop writes (p. 62), *I venture to say that in these brief opening sentences of the Epistle there is no argument.* I do not profess to understand the distinction which the Bishop assumes to exist between an argument and a *line of thought.* But there is no need to discuss it: for, proceeding to expound St. Paul's *line of thought,* he has given a statement of what I should call the argument, which I could endorse in all points but one. Still it may be convenient for me to restate it in my own words. The third verse opens with the words "Concerning His Son," *i.e.* the Son of God. Having applied this title to Jesus, the Apostle naturally proceeds to justify himself for so doing. He adduces two proofs. Jesus was a lineal descendant of David in the male line (for the Jews recognised only the "tail male"), and therefore He *might* be the Messiah, one of whose titles in Apocalyptic literature was "Son of God." And secondly He had risen from the dead, as (according to a current misinterpretation of Psalm xvi. 10) the Messiah was destined to do. Therefore He *was* the Messiah, and might be called the Son of God. That is, in brief, St. Paul's argument to prove that Jesus was the Son of God in the Messianic sense. Let us suppose for a moment that instead of the former conditional proof, he had been able to say that a miraculous birth marked Him as the Son of God in an absolute sense. Is it conceivable that he would have neglected a piece of evidence so irresistible? Common sense can answer that question only in one way.

Attention is withdrawn from this, which is the real issue, by a digression on the general validity of the argument from silence (*B. and C.*, pp. 63–65). *If we argue that silence proves ignorance*, we may doubtless arrive at very absurd conclusions. The Bishop himself affords us an example in this very chapter. But I did not so argue. I merely urged that in this particular case it is difficult to imagine how any man acquainted with the story of the Lord's birth from a Virgin could have failed to bring it forward. And that argument is strengthened by the plain fact that in the whole of St. Paul's epistles there is admittedly no suggestion of such a miracle.

(4) *But if St. John makes no explicit allusion to the story of the Lord's wonderful birth, is there anything in the language which he uses in the Gospel which shows that he assumes on the part of his readers a knowledge of this story as true?* (*B. and C.*, p. 67).

To this question also Professor Bethune-Baker's book has by anticipation given a general answer. I take the liberty of quoting from pages 74–6 of *The Faith of the Apostles' Creed*:

"It is, however, when we come to the Johannic writings that the absence of all reference to the belief is most remarkable. For by the time the Fourth Gospel was written it is almost certain that the belief was current, at all events in some Christian circles. There is good reason to suppose that the author knew the Gospels of St. Mark and St. Luke. It is a well-based theory, widely held by students of his Gospel, that he frequently 'intervenes' to

correct or to supplement the narratives of his predecessors in the difficult task of presenting the full truth about Jesus. Deliberately and expressly he sets himself to convince his readers that 'Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God' (xx. 31), and he identifies Him with the Logos who was in the beginning, and was with God and was God (i. 1); who, he proclaims, 'became flesh,' and was manifested in Jesus: Jesus was the Logos incarnate. While the other Evangelists appear to adopt a simple and straightforward method of historical narration of the chief incidents and sayings which were known to them, and let them speak for themselves, as it were, the author of the Fourth Gospel presents us with a selection of incidents carefully chosen and expressly designed to illustrate the real personality of his subject Jesus. Each of them is a 'sign,' or symbol, or evidence, of what He really is. The author calls special attention to their symbolical significance, and in most cases uses them as the 'text' of long discourses in which the various attributes and characteristics of the Person represented as speaking are expounded. The selection even of small details is made with a view to their value as illustrative of some point in the discourse, or some trait in the personality, which is to be noted.

"They are all, it is true, what we call 'miracles,' done by Jesus, to manifest His glory. They are pressed upon the reader as signs of what He is in Himself. Through them His true nature and being is indicated. His mother plays a part in the narrative of the first of these signs and in the narrative of the closing hours of His life on earth. Women are conspicuous in other scenes in the Gospel as vehicles through which the revelation of Himself is made. The reality of His manhood, His dependence

on His Father in heaven, is emphasised, and at the same time His real oneness with the Father. Yet the 'sign' of what He was, which is believed to be furnished by the manner of His birth, is left unnoticed. His birth was not, of course, strictly speaking, something which Jesus 'did'; but it was clearly, according to the doctrine of St. John, an act of the Logos, with whom Jesus is identified: 'The Logos became flesh.'

"We should go farther than the nature of the evidence allows us to go, if we drew the inference that the author of the Gospel deliberately intended tacitly to discredit the belief which was probably already current. But, if the evidence of his Gospel is allowed any weight at all, when the special purpose and the plan of it is considered, we can hardly escape the conclusion that he did not find in what he knew about the manner of our Lord's birth any evidence of what He was which he could offer to convince men that the doctrine of the Incarnation was the true explanation of the facts. The doctrine of the Incarnation, as expounded in the Fourth Gospel, does not need the support of St. Luke's account of the Nativity. It stands on a different level, and it stands by its own strength."

Convincing as that statement is, it does not touch the three particular "points" to which the Bishop invites our attention. I am obliged, therefore, to examine them.

(*A*) The first argument is very like one which has already been examined and found wanting (pp. 35, 36). Scholars are practically unanimous in saying that the ordinary text of St. John i. 13 is correct: "As many as received Him, to them

gave He power to become the Sons of God, even to them that believe on His name; *which were born* (*οἵ ἐγεννήθησαν*) not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." A few inferior manuscripts substitute for the words in italics the singular *who was born*, making "who" refer to "his" as its antecedent. The change, as any one can see, destroys the meaning of the whole sentence: and the Bishop does not defend it. Yet he argues that the copyist who made this unreasonable alteration understood St. John's real mind, and intended by the change to supply a link between St. John's own words and the birth-narratives of St. Matthew and St. Luke. What is the link? it may be asked. *The spiritual generation of believers is analogous to the physical generation of Him on whom they believe* (*B. and C.*, p. 60). The copyist indicated that analogy by falsifying the text, and so expressed the Evangelist's true meaning! Few readers will care to pursue the subject further. Those who desire a detailed refutation of the Bishop's argument will find it in *The Faith of the Apostles' Creed*, pp. 108, 109.

(*B*) "*And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us.*" *In those words there is of course a complete absence of any hint that the Word came into the world through the ordinary process of human generation. However simple, the language is most unusual and most mysterious. The unique character would be wholly intelligible, and was designed, I believe, to be wholly intelligible, to those who in the preceding sentence had been compelled to remember the Lord's wonderful birth.*

Surely this argument comes a little strangely from the author who has just devoted four pages (62–5) to denouncing the argument from silence! All the considerations which he there urged apply with tenfold force to his own reasoning.

The fact represented by "the Word became flesh" is indeed, to use the Bishop's delicate phrase, *most unusual*. But the language, far from being unusual, is perfectly straightforward and intelligible. He came into the world, He invested Himself in flesh, and took up His abode [1] among men. The words cannot be twisted to convey any hint as to the manner of His coming or of His becoming flesh. They are so abstract, so free from suggestion, positive or negative, that they might be applied unchanged to the incarnation of Buddha, as described in the Buddhist sacred books.[2]

(C) *The two passages, then, in which the words "the Son of Joseph" are found are, I submit, signal instances of this Johannine irony.*

The argument may be briefly stated thus. A favourite device of the Greek tragedian Sophocles was to put into the mouth of one of his characters a sentence which to the audience, who knew the whole story, was charged with a meaning of which the speaker was unconscious. Thus Oedipus, who knew not that he himself was the slayer of his father Laïus, promises to avenge him, and adds: "In doing right to Laïus, I serve myself." St. John, in like manner, represents Jews as using words in

[1] That is a common use of the word ἐσκήνωσεν.
[2] See Sir Edwin Arnold's *Light of Asia*.

ignorance which to the reader mean much. The Bishop quotes as one example, "Hath not the Scripture said that the Christ cometh of the seed of David, and from Bethlehem, the village where David was?" and points out the reference to Bethlehem as an instance of Johannine irony; since the reader knows (what presumably the speakers did not) that Jesus was born at Bethlehem, not at Nazareth. But he fails to observe the much more important and significant example which lies in the words "of the seed of David." The Jews presumably did not know, what St. John expects the reader to know well, that Jesus was in the full sense of the seed of David (*supra*, pp. 42, 43). I lay no stress upon this: for arguments of this subjective kind, which have to be introduced (*B. and C.*, p. 72) with *We cannot suppose* and *Is to my mind a clear proof*, are of little value. But it seems worth while just to show how easily this kind of argument is turned against its author.

(5) The final section of the chapter on the Virgin Birth is one which I should have preferred to leave unanswered, but for the definite challenge which was thrown down in the first paragraph. There are two points upon which I now feel obliged to touch.

One is a trifling matter. The Bishop reads me a lecture because I wrote, "As to the Virgin Birth it is urged that the evidence is not such as to compel belief." Adopting his favourite method of *reductio ad absurdum*, he writes: *Compulsory belief is not belief properly so called, but knowledge.* The careful reader will be amused to find such an argument

offered by the author of a sentence quoted above (p. 48) which ends with the words, *those who in the preceding sentence had been compelled to remember the Lord's wonderful birth.* I abstain from speculating as to the nature of *compulsory memory*, which opens a wide field for such humour as the Bishop loves to exhibit. But in the interest of good sense I must justify my own phrase. Greek writers, especially the orators, believed in the effectiveness of understatement. They would often say " not better " instead of " much worse," " not irrelevant " for " very much to the point," and so forth. This mode of speech was so much used that it acquired a technical name—μείωσις or understatement. The influence of Greek studies has given rise to a similar usage among such English writers as are classical scholars. Having been familiar all my life with Greek authors, I sometimes find it natural to adopt this mode of expression. So I wrote " the evidence does not compel belief " instead of using the Bishop's phrase, *the evidence is slight*, because it seemed to me both more effective and less likely to cause offence.

The second point must be treated seriously. As the Bishop said at the beginning of his third chapter, most of the arguments which he uses *have been advanced before.* But he has put forward one which I believe to be entirely his own. Since it involves an excursion into the region of physical science, with which my acquaintance is very superficial, I have referred it to a scientific friend, an eminent

biologist. I am glad to find that his judgment confirms the impression which I had formed. The Bishop's argument is as follows:

It may well be that the study of the phenomena connected with heredity will presently throw light on the problem of the entail of moral character through the father's and the mother's influence in the process of human generation, and that we shall be able hereafter to consider from a scientific point of view the relation between the Virgin conception and the sinlessness of the Lord.

The originality of this remark consists in its being an attempt to find a scientific equivalent for a legal argument which has been current for some years. It was, I understand, Bishop Gore who first said that the Virgin Birth "cut off the entail of sin": and the phrase soon became a catchword in certain circles. It enjoyed none the less currency because the word "entail" was used in an inaccurate popular sense as equivalent to "inheritance in tail male." It was a suggestive and attractive analogy. But the Bishop of Ely, in transferring the thought from the sphere of law to that of science, is bold enough to anticipate a scientific proof. For comment upon the legal analogy I would refer the reader to Professor Bethune-Baker's *Faith of the Apostles' Creed*, pp. 82–6. With regard to the scientific forecast I cannot do better than quote the essential part of a letter which Professor Punnett wrote in reply to my questions:

"That the study of the phenomena connected

with heredity will throw light upon the *transmission* of moral as well as of physical characters is beyond doubt. Indeed, there is good evidence that the inheritance of certain forms of feeble-mindedness, with the peculiar moral features it connotes, conforms to the usual scheme of heredity for physical characters. But the use of the word " entail " introduces an unnecessary element of confusion. The legal conceptions here involved have no place in the process of human generation as understood to-day. In so far as material contribution to the offspring is concerned, apart from cases of sex-limited inheritance, the two sexes are on a level. Feeble-mindedness may be equally transmitted by the father or by the mother. The word ' sinlessness ' has at present no meaning scientifically. Should it, however, become possible to translate it in terms of hereditary factors, there is no room for supposing that these factors would not follow the normal distribution for both parents in the scheme of heredity.

" The point raised by the Bishop with regard to the relative influence of the two parents in heredity is one that is being actively investigated in connection with sex-limited inheritance. There are certainly many cases known in which the sexes differ in this respect. The evidence available for the human species suggests that the woman transmits equally to both sexes, while the man may transmit certain characters to his daughters only. It is not, however, impossible that the woman may also, in certain cases, be found to transmit unequally to the different sexes. Certainly the hen does.

" I am not sure that I grasp the meaning of the latter part of the Bishop's sentence. But I assume that he is raising the question of heredity in con-

nection with parthenogenesis, and that by 'Virgin conception' he means the development of the ovum without fertilisation by a spermatozoon. This we know may be artificially induced in some animals, especially in echinoderms and frogs; but so far there is no evidence for its occurrence in a mammal. Nevertheless the possibility must not be disregarded. There is, however, no reason for supposing that in parthenogenesis the ordinary segregation of hereditary factors is dispensed with. On the contrary, there is good evidence from insects that the normal distribution of these factors takes place. Were a feeble-minded woman to produce offspring parthenogenetically, one would be surprised if these children were not also feeble-minded, and with the attitude towards the decalogue which this state implies. If moral characters depend upon a hereditary basis, and I think at present we must assume that they do, we should not expect parthenogenesis to affect the nature of the mother's output of germ-cells. For this, of course, is determined long before her own are matured. The statement that 'the Virgin Birth cuts off the entail of sin' may mean something mystically: scientifically it is nonsense."

Most readers will find Professor Punnett's answer convincing. But let us suppose for a moment that he is mistaken, and that the science of the future will report in the sense which the Bishop desires. What would that report involve? In the first place the report must be based upon several undeniable examples of parthenogenesis, which have been carefully studied. If a generalisation from these examples were to assure us that all immoral tendencies are derived from the father, and that one born of a

virgin is free from sin, what conclusion should we be entitled to draw? Certainly not that each of these was μονογενὴς υἱὸς Θεοῦ (the only-begotten Son of God), for that would be a contradiction in terms. Either they must all be the fruit of miracle, and in that sense sons of God: or they must all belong to a new class of men, natural but exceptional. In the former case the uniqueness of Jesus Christ, and all that follows from it, would have to be given up. In the latter case He would, so far as birth is concerned, be accounted one of the newly discovered species of superior men.

Having denied the premise upon which this argument is based, I am free to reject both the alternative conclusions. It is for those who accept the premise to choose upon which horn of the dilemma they prefer to be impaled.

CHAPTER IV

POINTS OF VIEW

THE fourth chapter of *B. and C.* begins with some pages devoted to an unfortunate blunder on my part, which I have already (in the second edition of the manual) admitted and regretted. By pure inadvertence I wrote "that Jesus appeared to several of His disciples after death is a fact . . . attested . . . by all four evangelists." Obviously I should have said three evangelists: for, as every possessor of a Revised Version knows, the last twelve verses of St. Mark's Gospel are not authentic. And on a later page I made a reference to St. Mark's narrative. The Bishop's criticism would have been more effective if it had been more restrained in expression. For no sensible reader will believe that I was really ignorant of such a commonplace fact. The effect produced by reading pages 84 and 156. reminds me of certain chemical experiments of my youth. Into a clear solution we poured some drops of acid, by way of test, which produced a precipitate. In some cases when we poured in some more of the acid the precipitate disappeared, and we wrote in our notes of the experiment "dissolved in excess." But I make no excuses for my blunder, and will not waste any time in explaining how it came to be made. I will merely point out that no criticism

of that particular mistake can affect the truth of the general statement in which it found a place; nor does the Bishop attempt to show that any false conclusion has been drawn from it.

The long and confused chapter which thus begins might more conveniently have been divided into three, for it really deals with three subjects: (*α*) General considerations about the interpretation of St. Paul; (*β*) The refutation of the opinion that St. Paul, in the course of the years covered by his epistles, changed his conception of the nature of the Resurrection; (*γ*) The Bishop's own interpretation of St. Paul's teaching. For the sake of clearness I propose to deal with these subjects in separate chapters, and to begin here with some remarks of general application.

(*A*) Pages 99–102 of *B. and C.* are directed to prove that my method of dealing with St. Paul's views of the Resurrection is radically wrong. The language of these pages is far from being clear: but, so far as I can judge, the essence of the argument lies in the following words:

The Canon reverses what I think I may call the universal and natural method, according to which St. Paul regarded, and Christian men have regarded, Christ's Resurrection as a revelation, and have found in it not only an assurance of their own resurrection, but also a clue to its character. The Canon, on the other hand, draws an imaginary picture of the events of the harvest . . . and from that imaginary picture infers what has taken place as to the firstfruits (*B. and C.*, pp. 100, 101).

Stripped of rhetoric and imagery, the meaning of this appears to be quite simple. "The proper method is to begin with what St. Paul knew of Christ's Resurrection, and then, using his parallel of the firstfruits and the harvest, to deduce from it the nature of man's resurrection." There would be much justice in this observation if one essential condition were fulfilled. If we knew exactly how St. Paul conceived Christ's Resurrection, we could follow this method: but what St. Paul knew of Christ's Resurrection is exactly the question to which there is no direct answer. On the authority of Bishop Westcott, his disciple (*B. and C.*, pp. 138–40) assumes as orthodox a conception of the Lord's Resurrection body, which is inconsistent alike with the Gospel narratives and with Church tradition; and he demands that we shall receive this as the truth and as that which St. Paul must obviously have known. My criticism of that conception will be found on pages 77–81. Here I am only concerned to show how it bears upon the subject of this paragraph. Since my critic himself entertains a conception which (I repeat) cannot be reconciled with the Gospel narratives or with the teaching of the early Fathers, he has no ground for asserting that this is what St. Paul held after he had *learned the facts about the Resurrection* from St. James and St. Peter (*B. and C.*, p. 107). He cannot logically refuse to admit that we have no direct knowledge as to St. Paul's original belief about the Resurrection body of the Lord. Though his method may be different, he arrives at his

opinion by a process of inference, just as I have tried to do.

As the description of my method, which is quoted above, is no more than a parody, I must give my own explanation of it.

St. Paul often speaks of the Resurrection of our Lord; but nowhere explains what he understands by the term. From Josephus, and other more or less contemporary Jewish writings, we know that the Pharisees, of whom he still claimed to be one after the four great epistles had been written (Acts xxiii. 6), held two distinct opinions. We are not entitled to assume to which of them he subscribed, but must look for guidance to his writings. We find such guidance in 1 Cor. xv. 13, 20, where he says that the Lord's Resurrection is the pledge and the type of ours, so that the two stand or fall together. This gives us authority (see *B. and C.*, p. 131) to infer from his words about man's resurrection what he believed about the Resurrection of our Lord. Now it is demonstrable that his beliefs about the nature of man's resurrection changed considerably.[1] The natural inference is that there was a corresponding change in his conception of Christ's Resurrection. I did not, however, venture to affirm that the correspondence was exact, but only that there must have been some change in the same direction.

In this longer statement it is proper to add a qualification, which would be out of place in an elementary manual, as liable to cause confusion. It will explain why I did not claim that the corre-

[1] See Chapter V.

spondence mentioned above was exact. Like Isaiah and other great prophets,[1] St. Paul had no great regard for consistency. Prophets rarely see the whole of what their new teaching involves, and often continue to maintain some old opinions which the new ones have superseded. It may be, therefore, that St. Paul did not change his conception of the Lord's Resurrection *pari passu* with the change in his belief about the resurrection of men. Even in our own day, when consistency is so highly valued, some scholars believe (in spite of St. Paul's image of the harvest of the firstfruits) that Christ's Resurrection was a resurrection of the flesh, while all others will rise with " a spiritual body." Whether this position is tenable or not, it suggests a possibility about St. Paul. We can imagine, if we please, that his conception of the Lord's Resurrection body, once formed, suffered comparatively little change.

This qualification can, of course, be of no account in the Bishop's estimation, for he refuses to admit that there is any change or inconsistency in St. Paul's opinions on any subject (*B. and C.*, pp. 108–11). Indeed much of his argument depends upon his assumption that I am as rigid as himself in applying the principle that St. Paul conceived the Resurrection of Christ to correspond exactly with man's resurrection. I do not complain of a misunderstanding, which was perhaps natural, but I am bound to point it out.

(*B*) This is perhaps the most convenient place

[1] See *infra*, pp. 63, 64.

for a few words about the argument in pages 87–9 of *B. and C.*, for the main question which it raises is connected with what I have just written. Picking out a phrase from page 26 of the manual, and transferring it, in a way which I should never have approved, to the account of our Lord's Resurrection, the Bishop makes it appear as if I had implicitly challenged the statement of the Creed that He rose again "on the third day."

Why I should never have approved such an application of my words will be obvious to any one who has read the last two paragraphs of § A. But I have to admit that in the sentence, "He now pictures the spiritual body as coming down from heaven to clothe the soul in the hour of death," the phrase "in the hour of death" was ill-chosen and did not really express my meaning. I should have written either "after a brief interval," or perhaps "on the third day." A strong reason in favour of the latter phrase is supplied by Bishop Westcott in his note on St. John xi. 39:

"*Dead four days.* The full significance of the words appears from a passage of Bereshith R.: 'It is a tradition of Ben Kuphra's: the very height of mourning is not till the third day. For three days the spirit wanders about the sepulchre, expecting if it may return into the body. But when it sees that the form or aspect of the face is changed, then it hovers no more, but leaves the body to itself.' . . . 'After three days,' it is said elsewhere, 'the countenance is changed.'"

If this opinion was general among the Jews of

the first century, we may fairly assume (without any direct statement on his part) that it was shared by St. Paul. The Jewish belief may in all probability be derived from a primitive tradition which is mentioned by Dr. Frazer,[1] according to which men used in old times, when they died, normally to rise to renewed life on the third day, but through some accident, or contrivance of an evil spirit, the power was lost.

"In the Caroline Islands," Dr. Frazer writes, "it is said that in the olden time death was unknown, or rather, it was only a short sleep. Men died on the last day of the waning moon, and came to life again on the appearance of the new moon, just as if they had wakened from a refreshing slumber. But an evil spirit somehow contrived that when men slept the sleep of death they should awake no more."

(*C*) A minor question, but not unimportant, is raised by the statement that "a *faithful historian will be careful not to ascribe to a religious teacher thoughts on which that teacher's contemporaries dwelt, or on which his predecessors dwelt, but which he himself did not expressly adopt*" (*B. and C.*, p. 93). Nothing would be easier than to treat the principle here laid down on the Bishop's favourite plan of *reductio ad absurdum*, and to show that some applications of it must lead to ludicrous results. But I prefer to treat it seriously, and I find an answer ready to my hand in a former book of my own.[2]

[1] *Folklore in the Old Testament*, vol. i. p. 72.

[2] *Studies in the Book of Isaiah*, pp. 98–100. (Oxford University Press, 1910.)

"Charged as he was with a divine commission to proclaim Jehovah the Lord of all the world, Isaiah might have been expected to lay down these laws of conduct for all nations. In fact, however, he addresses his admonitions to Israel alone. More than this, he speaks of Israel as the only people whom Jehovah regards with favour. They are not merely the chosen people, preferred in some degree to the rest: the others exist only as instruments for their education. . . . It is not too much to say that, unless it be in the complaint of Asshur's pride, there is no hint of a moral relation between Jehovah and any part of the heathen world.

"Here, then, is what seems to modern eyes an obvious inconsistency. Jehovah is the Creator and Ruler of all mankind, and yet has no interest in any but one of the smallest nations! Is it possible to harmonise or explain these conflicting views of God's providence? Harmony, from the Christian point of view, there cannot be. But it seems possible to lessen the inconsistency, and to explain how the prophet could be unconscious of it.

"The world's greatest teachers have rarely seen the whole bearing of the new truths which they proclaimed. Long habit and the influence of environment have prevented them from drawing conclusions which to their disciples of a later generation seem obvious. St. Paul, for instance, the inspired interpreter of Christ's teaching, who laid down principles which logically involved the abolition of slavery, and the recognition of women's equality with men, yet advised the slave to be content with his chains, and spoke of women with no small leaven of Judaic contempt. In like manner, it would appear, patriotic enthusiasm, and the lingering influences of the henotheistic belief which he had

discarded, clouded Isaiah's eyes, so that he saw not the full meaning of the message which he delivered.

"It is not because he freed himself from all the particularist prejudices of his age, nor because he attained a complete system of theology, nor because he formed a consistent theory of Providence, that Isaiah holds the first place among the Hebrew prophets. He did none of these things. He left many questions to be answered by the great prophet of the sixth century, or later still. But he who sows the seed is greater than he who reaps the harvest."

These words appear to me to apply no less to St. Paul than to Isaiah. We are, in fact, bound to assume that in many things the prophet holds the current opinions of his age: for if he did not he would be so out of touch with his contemporaries that he could make no effective appeal to them.

(*D*) There are two points of view from which we may approach St. Paul's teaching. One is that of the modern Western theologian, whose ideal for himself is above all to be logical, exact, and consistent. He naturally expects to find in the Apostle a signal example of the qualities which he desires for himself. He is, therefore, not satisfied until he has found means to "harmonise" all the Apostle's different utterances which bear upon any given doctrine. With perseverance and a plentiful lack of the sense of humour, wonders can be accomplished in this direction.[1] But, after all, as Luther says, "St. Paul's sentences are living creatures: they

[1] See *B. and C.*, pp. 38–40, and 96.

have hands and feet"; and consequently they cannot permanently be pinned down upon any theological bed of Procrustes. The other point of view is taken by those who remember that St. Paul was "an Hebrew of the Hebrews," trained in those Rabbinical methods of argument which appear to us to defy logic, and a prophet whose great thoughts came to him not as the results of any logical process, but as visions projected by the subconscious self, which, under the stimulus of inspiration, has wrought them in secret out of the matter of experience. Such visions are a true index of the progress of revelation in the prophet's soul. They show the direction in which he is moving. They are beacons for the guidance of his followers. But neither he nor any one else can weave them into a regular system. For just as methodical consistency is the hall mark of the Western theologian, so that measure of inconsistency which is inseparable from rapid spiritual growth is characteristic of the prophet.[1]

When, therefore, I describe three stages of St. Paul's belief about the Resurrection, I do not mean to imply that each was developed from its predecessor by a conscious process of reasoning; nor that having passed from one to another, he never looked back. About the Resurrection, as about other subjects, it is easy to convict him of occasional inconsistency; and there are points at which two modes of thought seem to overlap. But in the rainbow the three primary colours are clearly apparent

[1] See above, pp. 63, 64.

in spite of the derivative shades which intervene: and in like manner no occasional overlapping, or return to old thoughts, can obscure the distinction between the three colours in which St. Paul saw his visions of the Resurrection. If we regard him not as a professor, but as a prophet, it is to these that we shall look for guidance and inspiration.

When we try to do this we are conscious of an obstacle which sometimes interferes with our vision. It is caused by the fact that St. Paul was not only a prophet, but also a mystic. In the epistles of the middle and later period we find a certain alternation of these two characters. As prophet he speaks of the Resurrection as something which is to happen after the death of the body, involving momentous experiences of the human soul. As mystic he uses the word "resurrection" to describe a present experience of the Christian while still living "in the body"—a spiritual transformation which is the guarantee (one might almost say the essential reality) of the external transformation which is to come. The late Professor T. H. Green[1] has written words which help us to understand the mystical view and its bearing on St. Paul's whole teaching:

"The death and rising again of Christ, as he conceived them, were not separate and independent events. They were two sides of the same act—an act which, relatively to sin, to the flesh, to the old man, to all which separates from God, is death; but which, just for that reason, is the birth of a new life relatively to God. This act, again, though St.

[1] *The Witness of God*, printed in his collected works, vol. iii.

Paul doubtless identified it upon its several sides with the crucifixion of Jesus upon Mount Calvary, was not to him an historical event, in the past now, as beforehand it had been in the future. Though they are not St. Paul's own words, yet it is quite in his spirit to say that Christ was 'slain from the foundation of the world.' Christ was that second man, who is the Lord from heaven. He was God's power and God's wisdom. God was in Him, so that what He did, God did. A death unto life, a life out of death, must then be in some way the essence of the divine nature—must be an act which, though exhibited once for all in the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ, was yet eternal, the act of God Himself.

"For that very reason, however, it was one perpetually re-enacted, and to be re-enacted, by man. If Christ died for all, all died in Him: all were buried in His grave, to be all made alive in His resurrection. It is so far as the second man, which is from heaven, and whose act is God's, thus lives and dies in us, that He becomes to us a wisdom of God, which is righteousness, sanctification, and redemption. In other words, He constitutes in us a new intellectual consciousness, which transforms the will and is the source of a new moral life."

Those words help us to understand in what sense St. Paul used such language as:

"We were buried therefore with Him through baptism into death; that like as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father, so we also might walk in newness of life" (Rom. vi. 4).

"We thus judge, that one died for all, therefore all died; and He died for all, that they which live should no longer live unto themselves" (2 Cor. v. 14, 15).

"If then ye were raised together with Christ, seek the things that are above. . . . For ye died, and your life is hid with Christ in God" (Col. iii. 1, 3).

The Bishop of Ely, so far as I can discover, treats all such statements as merely metaphorical (*e.g. B. and C.*, p. 122), and thereby seriously vitiates his argument. For in St. Paul's eyes they were no mere metaphors, but the expression of an experience which was central in his own religious life. United with Christ by faith and baptism, he had passed through a transformation which seemed more significant than the death and resurrection of the body, and he desired the same blessing for all his converts. Mystical, difficult, as the conception is to us, it satisfied the spiritual needs of many Christians. In St. John's Gospel the thought of the new life implanted in the living man has almost put out of sight the death of the body. But, like other great conceptions, it was misapplied and misunderstood by some who came after. The second epistle to Timothy, for instance, contains a warning against the heresy of those who, interpreting St. Paul's phrases literally, said "that the resurrection is past already" (2 Tim. ii. 18). St. Paul himself lent no countenance to any such literalism. It would almost seem as if he had foreseen and provided against it. For when he spoke of the "earnest of the Spirit," or "the firstfruits of the Spirit," as the

guarantee of the Resurrection, he was describing in more ordinary language the same experience which in mystical language he called death and resurrection.

Only those who recognise the true nature of such passages as those which I have quoted from Romans, Corinthians, and Colossians can escape from the danger of misapplying them in arguments about the Resurrection. They lie in a different plane of thought from what I have called the prophetic passages, and the attempt to pass from the one plane to the other is perilous for any commentator who is not, like St. Paul, both prophet and mystic.

(*E*) Readers of *B. and C.*, if unacquainted with the literature of Pauline theology, would be led to suppose that the account of his views about the Resurrection, which are stated in my manual, was an entirely new heresy. The fact is that I merely presented in a popular form a theory which has been familiar to scholars for more than thirty years. The same general idea, though with considerable differences of detail, has been set forth in a number of well-known books. A brief and clear statement is contained in Canon Charles's *Eschatology*.[1] Thackeray's subsequent book, *The Relation of St. Paul to Contemporary Jewish Thought*, worked the theory out in more detail, with ample references to modern writers. Five years earlier Auguste Sabatier published his *Monograph on St. Paul*, which goes a long way in the same direction: and at the same time

[1] *Eschatology, Hebrew, Jewish, and Christian.* (A. & C. Black, 1899 and 1913.)

appeared Teichmann's *Die Paulinischen Vorstellungen von Auferstehung und Gericht.* These writers, and others who have followed the same line of thought, do not agree in every detail, and I had sometimes to make a choice between rival views. But that is the extent of my originality so far as St. Paul's teaching about man's resurrection is concerned.

CHAPTER V

SAINT PAUL'S THREE STAGES

THERE are, as many scholars believe, three main stages in the development of St. Paul's beliefs about the Resurrection. The first is represented by the epistles to the Thessalonians ; the second by the first epistle to the Corinthians; the third by the second epistle to the Corinthians, the epistle to the Romans, and the epistle to the Philippians. I propose to give some account of each of these stages, so as to justify the bare outline which was given in the manual. In each case I will begin by quoting the relevant passages from the Revised Version :

(**A**) "But we would not have you ignorant, brethren, concerning them that fall asleep ; that ye sorrow not, even as the rest, which have no hope. For if we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so them also that are fallen asleep in Jesus will God bring with Him. For this we say unto you by the word of the Lord, that we that are alive, that are left unto the coming of the Lord, shall in no wise precede them that are fallen asleep. For the Lord Himself shall descend from heaven, with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God : and the dead in Christ shall rise first : then we that are alive, that are left, shall together with them be caught up in the clouds, to meet the

Lord in the air: and so shall we ever be with the Lord. Wherefore comfort one another with these words" (1 Thess. iv. 13–18).

"And the God of peace Himself shall sanctify you wholly; and may your spirit and soul and body be preserved entire, without blame at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ" (1 Thess. v. 23).

"If so be that it is a righteous thing with God to recompense affliction to them that afflict you, and to you that are afflicted rest with us, at the revelation of the Lord Jesus from heaven with the angels of His power in flaming fire, rendering vengeance to them that know not God, and to them that obey not the Gospel of our Lord Jesus: who shall suffer punishment, *even* eternal destruction from the face of the Lord and from the glory of His might, when He shall come to be glorified in His saints, and to be marvelled at in all them that believed (because our testimony unto you was believed) in that day" (2 Thess. i. 6–10).

Dr. Kennedy[1] has well said that these passages are "a veritable mosaic of quotations from the Old Testament." Only those who compare them verse by verse with the Septuagint—which was St. Paul's Bible just as much as the Authorised Version is ours—can appreciate the extent to which the Apostle has used the language especially of the later prophetic writings, showing how his mind was steeped in the prophetic and apocalyptic thought of later Judaism. A tolerably full list of parallels will be found in a a note at the end of this chapter.[2] For

[1] H. A. A. Kennedy, *St. Paul's Conception of the Last Things*, p. 47.

[2] See Additional Note II., p. 115.

our immediate purpose it may suffice to quote Dr. Kennedy's summary:

"God's Son is to come from heaven [1] with all His holy ones (Zech. xiv. 4; Dan. vii. 13). He is to descend with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and the trumpet of God (Isa. xxvii. 13; Ex. xix. 11, 13, 16, 17, 18). The Day of the Lord will surprise them as a thief in the night (Joel ii. 1–11). The Lord Jesus is to be revealed from heaven in flaming fire (Isa. lxvi. 15; Ps. xviii. 8; Ex. xxiv. 17; Deut. iv. 24). He takes vengeance on them that know not God (Isa. xxxv. 4; Jer. x. 25). They are punished with destruction from the face of the Lord and from the glory of His power (Isa. ii. 10). He shall be glorified in His saints (Isa. lxvi. 5, xlix. 3; Ps. xviii. 1)."

Dr. Kennedy's list of references must be supplemented by two to the Book of Enoch. For convenience of the reader I quote the passages in full from Dr. Charles's translation:

"And behold! He cometh with ten thousands of His holy ones, to execute judgment upon all, and to destroy all the ungodly: and to convict all flesh of their ungodliness which they have ungodly com-

[1] The parallel is even more complete than Dr. Kennedy has observed. For there are two distinct statements, which correspond to two passages in the Old Testament. (α) God will bring Jesus and those who have fallen asleep in Him (into the visible heaven, but not to earth), 1 Thess. iv. 14. This corresponds to Dan. vii. 13, where The Ancient of Days (= Jehovah) and One like unto the Son of Man (= the Messiah) are mentioned as appearing together in the sky. (β) "The Lord will come down from heaven" (to earth), 1 Thess. iv. 16. This corresponds to Exod. xix. 11, the title Lord being transferred, as often in St. Paul's writings, from Jehovah to Christ.

mitted, and of all the hard things which ungodly sinners have spoken against Him" (Enoch i. 9).

"And for all of you sinners there shall be no salvation, but on you all shall abide a curse. But for the elect there shall be light and joy and peace, and they shall inherit the earth" (Enoch iii. 7).

While the actual quotations show that the background of the Apostle's thought was mainly woven out of current apocalyptic literature (for the passages in Isaiah and Zechariah to which he refers are all late apocalyptic insertions, mostly of the third or second century B.C.), the picture will not be complete unless we recall two other facts. The book of Daniel and two of the Apocalypses which are included in the composite book of Enoch [(1) Enoch vi.–xxxv., dated by Canon Charles 167 B.C., and (2) Enoch lxxxiii.–xc., dated about 163 B.C.] all foretell a Messianic kingdom of the saints on earth, which is to be preceded by the resurrection *in the flesh* of the righteous Israelites, in order that they may share in the blessedness of that kingdom.

The book of Revelation, written perhaps as much as thirty years after Philippians, when Jewish influence was declining, shows how near the thought of some Christian circles still approached to that of Daniel and Enoch. It tends to prove that the atmosphere breathed by St. Paul and his converts was impregnated with the traditional Apocalyptic conceptions. The John of the vision tells how the Christian saints and martyrs, whose souls had long been "underneath the altar" crying out for ven-

geance (v. 9), " came to life,[1] and reigned with Christ a thousand years " (xx. 4). A special feature of this vision brings it very near to 2 Thess. i. Christ and the saints are to dwell in " the holy city Jerusalem," [2] which has come down from heaven (xxi. 10) : of which we are told " there shall in no wise enter into it anything unclean, or he that maketh an abomination and a lie, but only they which are written in the Lamb's Book of Life " (xx. 27). In 2 Thess. i. 9, 10 we read that they that know not God " shall suffer punishment, even age-long [3] (*αἰώνιον*) destruction from the face of the Lord and from the glory of His might, when He shall come to be glorified in (*i.e.* among) His saints." It will be seen that the book of Revelation supplies the details of time and place which are not mentioned in the verse of Thessalonians, but without which it is not intelligible to us. The general belief in the Messianic reign on earth was so familiar that St. Paul could take it for granted in writing to the Thessalonians. When he wrote later to the Corinthians, he mentioned the Messianic reign on earth, with conflicts against the heathen world such as are named in Revelation, though he did not speak of Jerusalem as the Lord's dwelling-place.[4]

[1] *ἔζησαν.* That this means a resurrection of the flesh is made probable by the subsequent statements that they are to reign over, and afterwards to fight against, the nations of the earth (Rev. xx. 6, 8, 9).

[2] For the distinction between this and the " New Jerusalem " of Isa. iv. I must refer the reader to Canon Charles's forthcoming edition of the book of Revelation, which is of extraordinary interest.

[3] I take this to mean " throughout the thousand years of the Messianic kingdom." See Mr. Major's article on *αἰώνιος* in *The Journal of Theological Studies* for October 1916.

[4] See Charles's *Eschatology*, p. 365 note.

Aided by these considerations we can with some certainty reproduce the picture which St. Paul meant to call up in the minds of the Thessalonians by the incomplete phrases which were charged with associations in their minds.

We must begin with the general statement which serves as an introduction. "Them also that are fallen asleep in Jesus will God bring with Him" (1 Thess. iv. 14). That is to say, God will appear in the heaven, bringing with Him Jesus and the saints. What is involved in that general statement, and what is to follow, the Apostle proceeds to explain, partly in 1 Thess. iv. 14–18, and partly in 2 Thess. i. 6–10.[1] Paul and most of his generation will be still alive at the time of the Coming. They will see the Lord (not God the Father: indeed it is hardly suggested that they will see Him at all) descending from the heaven (iv. 16), and will hear the summons—the voice of an archangel and the tones of a trumpet—which wakens those who are "asleep in Jesus." These will be restored to life, and join the survivors: then all together will be "caught up in clouds" to meet the Lord while He is still in the air. Since the word used of His descending is *καταβαίνω*, which always means coming down to a definite point—in Apocalyptic passages to earth or Hades—we are bound to assume that His descent ends only when He reaches the earth. And plainly the saints return in His train, for they are to attend Him at His "coming" (*παρουσία*, which

[1] The second epistle was avowedly written as a supplement, because the first had been partially misunderstood.

always means coming to earth, iii. 13), and they are to be ever with Him and to glorify Him (iv. 17 ; i. 10). His immediate task will be to judge the wicked, especially those who have denied the Gospel and persecuted the believers. They will be banished from His presence while He dwells among His saints who glorify Him and marvel at Him (i. 8–10).

One question still remains to be answered. When the dead in Christ rise, in what body do they come ? Does St. Paul, when he writes to the Thessalonians, mean to imply that their natural bodies are restored or that they are invested with " spiritual bodies," such as are mentioned in 1 Cor. xv. ? There are strong reasons for believing that, in this case, he conceived the natural bodies to be restored.

(1) Nothing is said of any change in the bodies of the survivors : the living and the lately dead immediately form one group, without any distinction being indicated : and they all move together to meet the Lord.

(2) The words of 1 Thess. v. 23, which are quoted above, seem to exclude the possibility that St. Paul may be contemplating any change in the bodies of the survivors. Body, soul, and spirit alike are to be " preserved entire " ; and that not *until* but " *at* the coming of the Lord Jesus." The passages quoted above (p. 22) from Irenaeus prove conclusively that this is what the orthodoxy of the second century believed, in spite of St. Paul's later writings.

(3) Some six years later St. Paul wrote to the Corinthians, " Behold, I tell you a mystery—the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be

changed." A mystery is something which has not been previously told. If St. Paul had not revealed this to the Corinthians, among whom he lived and taught for a year and a half (Acts xviii. 11), but left them (as appears from 1 Cor. xv.) to hold the Jewish belief, how can we suppose that he made the revelation to the Thessalonians a few months earlier? The absence of any evidence that he did so seems to confirm the impression we have gained from the first epistle to the Thessalonians that the teaching which he gave them had been in conformity with the books of Daniel and Enoch. The further question must then be asked, Could he have taught them to believe in a resurrection of the flesh unless that was his own belief at the time? To me this appears in the highest degree improbable.

(4) Since St. Paul had been brought up as a Pharisee, and avowed himself such towards the end of his life, we may take into account some words of Josephus, written not very long after the fall of Jerusalem. Of the Pharisees he writes: "They think also that all souls are immortal, but that the souls of good men only are removed into other bodies, while the souls of bad men are punished with eternal punishment" (*Bell. Jud.*, bk. ii. 9, § 14). And again, in *Antiquities*, xviii. 1, § 3: "They also believe that souls have an immortal power in them, and that there will be under the earth rewards or punishments, according as we have lived virtuously or viciously in this life; and the latter souls are to be detained in an everlasting prison, but the former will have power to live again." On the other hand

it is evident from writings of the first century B.C. that some Pharisees believed only in a "spiritual resurrection"—*i.e.* that the souls of the righteous would be released from Sheol and rise into a sphere of incorporeal blessedness. This latter view does not appear to have been held by St. Paul at any time.

Taking all these considerations together, surely we must decide that when St. Paul wrote from Corinth to the Thessalonians he believed in a resurrection of the flesh. The evidence, such as it is, all points in that direction; and there is nothing on the other side, except the unproved assumption that he must at this time have held the same belief which appears in the later epistles.

Let us now turn to p. 96 of *B. and C.*: "*The ascription to him of a belief 'in the resurrection as the reconstitution of the earthly body of flesh' is absolutely without justification of any kind.*"

Different readers will naturally make different estimates of the arguments which I have submitted in the last eight pages. But I should be surprised if any of them, who has any acquaintance with the laws of evidence, were to endorse the Bishop's denial that any evidence exists.

On the same page there is the following note about the interpretation of 1 Thess. v. 23: "*It is clear that the reference is to moral 'preservation' (note 'sanctify' and 'without blame'); compare iv. 1–8. But even if we give a wider sense to the phrase τὸ σῶμα τηρηθείη, such 'preservation' would not exclude a refashioning.' In the resurrection the body will be 'preserved'* because *it will be changed.'*"

Besides what has been said about this verse on page 77, it may be observed—

(*a*) τηρεῖν is a common word in the New Testament. Its principal meanings are to guard persons, to observe or keep laws, and to keep faith or persons unchanged. It would be interesting to see the effect of translating 2 Tim. iv. 7 in the new way: "I have preserved the faith by changing it." I venture to say that there is not a single passage in the New Testament where the idea of change in connection with τηρεῖν is admissible.

(*β*) τηρεῖν does not stand alone, but the phrase is τηρεῖν ὁλόκληρον. Now if there is a word in Greek which excludes the idea of change it is ὁλόκληρον, which means entire, complete, like the Latin *integer*.

The reasoning in the above notes is similar to that on pp. 38–40 of *B. and C.*, where it is maintained that "the resurrection of the flesh" and "the resurrection of the spiritual body" mean the same thing. If words may be thus interpreted, in defiance of usage and context, it is a hopeless task to interpret any writer's meaning.

About "the reign of the Messiah on earth" St. Paul in this passage does not say one single word. The ascription to him of this belief also is absolutely without justification of any kind (*B. and C.*, p. 96).

By "this passage" the Bishop evidently means 1 Thess. iv. 13–18, which he has printed in full (*B. and C.*, pp. 92, 93). But why, may I ask, has he taken no notice of 2 Thess. i. 6–10, which is at least as important, and happens to contain all the

evidence on this particular point? Since he does not follow Schmiedel in denying the authenticity of the second epistle, I can only suppose that he forgot its existence. For had it been present to his mind he could no more have written the first of the sentences quoted above than he could write "The correspondent tells us that the Fourth Army crossed the Rhine at Cologne in six hours. He does not say a single word about a bridge. Therefore we must assume that they crossed in boats." For, as has been shown above, the reign of the Messiah on earth is part of the background of thought which was common to St. Paul and his Jewish contemporaries, and without assuming it we could attach no tolerable meaning to several of his phrases. Whether conclusive or not, the evidence collected on pp. 72–77 is too solid to be dismissed with a contemptuous wave of the hand.

There is another "justification" for ascribing this belief to St. Paul at this stage, which must specially appeal to the Bishop. It is generally admitted that in 1 Cor. xv. St. Paul refers to a Messianic reign on earth.[1] Since, as we are told in *B. and C.*, pp. 108–10, St. Paul did not change his mind, between A.D. 50 and his death, on any doctrinal subject, he must have held that belief when he wrote to the Thessalonians. That is not merely an *argumentum ad hominem*; for without believing that St. Paul never changed, one is naturally inclined to suppose that if he held the common Jewish opinion in A.D. 57 he had already held it in 52.

[1] See *infra*, pp. 83, 84.

(**B**) "For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive. But each in his own order: Christ the firstfruits; then they that are Christ's, at His coming. Then *cometh* the end, when He shall deliver up the kingdom to God, even the Father; when He shall have abolished all rule and all authority and power. For He must reign, till He hath put all His enemies under His feet. The last enemy that shall be abolished is death. For, He put all things in subjection under His feet. But when He saith, All things are put in subjection, it is evident that He is excepted who did subject all things unto Him. And when all things have been subjected unto Him, then shall the Son also Himself be subjected to Him that did subject all things unto Him, that God may be all in all" (1 Cor. xv. 22–28).

"But some one will say, How are the dead raised? and with what manner of body do they come? Thou foolish one, that which thou thyself sowest is not quickened, except it die: and that which thou sowest, thou sowest not the body that shall be, but a bare grain, it may chance of wheat, or of some other kind; but God giveth it a body even as it pleased Him, and to each seed a body of its own. All flesh is not the same flesh: but there is one *flesh* of men, and another flesh of beasts, and another flesh of birds, and another of fishes. There are also celestial bodies, and bodies terrestrial: but the glory of the celestial is one, and the *glory* of the terrestrial is another. There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars; for one star differeth from another star in glory. So also is the resurrection of the dead. It is sown in corruption; it is raised in incorruption: it is sown in dishonour; it is raised in glory: it is sown in weakness; it is raised in power: it is sown

a natural body; it is raised a spiritual body. If there is a natural body, there is also a spiritual *body*" (1 Cor. xv. 35–44).

"Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption. Behold, I tell you a mystery: We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump: for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed. For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality" (1 Cor. xv. 50–3).

In this famous chapter, as in most of the passages which refer to "the last things," the resurrection is intimately associated with the Messianic kingdom. Here, therefore, we must begin by drawing an outline of the picture which St. Paul seems to have had in his mind. What has been written already on pages 72–77 and 81 may serve as an introduction, so that the mere outline will suffice.

(*a*) The last trump sounds, and Christ appears, descending from heaven (vv. 23, 52).

(*b*) The righteous dead rise in their "spiritual bodies," while the living righteous are transformed into the like fashion (vv. 22, 52). Nothing is said here of their rising to meet the Lord in the air (1 Thess. iv. 17). It seems to be assumed that they all await Him on the earth.

(*c*) The Messianic kingdom begins.[1] Christ reigns

[1] It may be objected that Canon Charles, whom I often quote, has pronounced against the idea that in 1 Cor. xv. St. Paul referred to a Messianic kingdom (*Eschatology*, second edition, pp. 408, 447–8). I have his authority, in a letter dated May 16th,

on earth, but not unchallenged: for He has to put all His enemies under His feet (vv. 24, 25). These are the human enemies described in Thessalonians. And He must also abolish the spiritual powers of evil which misled them (all rule and all authority and power, v. 24).

(*d*) As in Revelation xx. 14 the climax of His victory is the destruction of death (v. 26).

(*e*) The completion of His triumph brings the temporary Messianic kingdom to an end. Christ will then "deliver up the kingdom to God, even the Father." So God shall be all in all: that is, the eternal kingdom of God begins (vv. 24, 28).

This description, though closely related to the Jewish apocalypses preserved in Daniel, Enoch, and elsewhere, does not exactly correspond to any of them. It nearly resembles those of the first century B.C. in three principal features—the personal Messiah, the temporary character of the Messianic kingdom, and the denial of a resurrection of the flesh. It differs from them, however, in placing the resurrection at the beginning and not at the end of the Messiah's reign, and from most of them (not all) in affirming that the spirits when they rise will be invested with a "spiritual body" and not remain disembodied. Another difference follows necessarily from St. Paul's whole teaching. The resurrection, instead of being limited to righteous Jews, is limited

1919, for saying that his real opinion is given in the note on p. 365, where he accepts the ordinary view; and that pp. 408, 447–8 were allowed to be reprinted from the first edition by inadvertence.

to faithful Christians.[1] Bearing these resemblances and differences in mind, we have to inquire what light the Jewish writings of the first century B.C. or a little later can throw upon the meaning of St. Paul's words: "It is raised a spiritual body."

Two of the writers of the first century B.C. give no hint of any bodily resurrection. The spirits of the wicked, they teach, will remain in Hades below, while "life" and "resurrection" are the privilege of the spirits of the righteous:

"They that fear the Lord shall rise (*ἀναστήσονται*) unto life eternal,

"And their life shall be in the light of the Lord, and shall never more come to an end" (*Psalms of Solomon*, iii. 16).

"Their inheritance [*i.e.* of the wicked] is Hades and darkness and destruction, and they shall not be found in the day when the righteous obtain mercy,

"But the Lord's holy ones shall inherit *life* in gladness" (*Psalms of Solomon*, xiv. 7).

"They that fear the Lord shall find mercy [in the day of judgment], and shall live by the compassion of their God,

"But sinners shall perish for ever" (*Psalms of Solomon*, xv. 16).

A similar prospect is held out in Enoch civ. 3, 4:

"All goodness and joy and glory are prepared for them, and written down for the spirits who have died in righteousness, and manifold good shall be given to you in recompense for your labours, and your lot is abundantly beyond the lot of the living.

[1] See Charles's *Eschatology*, p. 449.

And *the spirits* of you who have died in righteousness shall live and rejoice, and their *spirits* shall not perish."

On the other hand, in the apocalypse which is contained in Enoch xxxvii.–lxxi. (*circa* 70 B.C.) we read that the spirits of the righteous on the day of judgment will be "clothed in garments of glory" or "garments of life" (Enoch lxii. 12). In Enoch cviii. 12 (probably a fragment of a second-century writing) it is said, "I will bring them forth in shining light"; and in the Secrets of Enoch (early first century A.D.), which may have been known to St. Paul, we read, "The Lord said unto Michael, Go and take Enoch from out his earthly garments, and put him in the garments of My glory." We are thereby reminded of the white robes (στολαὶ λευκαὶ) which are several times mentioned in the book of Revelation, especially in vi. 11, where a white robe is given to each of *the spirits* of the slain which John saw under the altar.

Though the Apocalypse of Baruch was probably written a few years after St. Paul's death, it throws so much light upon the Jewish beliefs of his generation that I venture to quote a long passage from Canon Charles's version:

"Chapter lxix.—Nevertheless, I will again ask from Thee, O Mighty One; yea, I will ask mercy from Him who made all things. In what shape will those live, who live in Thy day? Will they resume this form of the present, and put on these entrammelling members, which are now involved in evils, and in

which evils are consummated; or wilt Thou perchance change these things which have been in the world, as also the world?

"l.—And He answered and said unto me: Hear, Baruch, this word, and write in the remembrance of thy heart all thou shalt learn. For the earth shall then assuredly restore the dead. It shall make no change in their form, but as it has received, so it shall restore them, and as I delivered them into it, so also shall it raise them. For then it will be necessary to show to the living that the dead have come to life again, and that those who had departed have returned. And it shall come to pass, when they have severally recognised those whom they now know, then judgment shall grow strong, and those things which before were spoken of shall come.

"li.—And it shall come to pass, when that appointed day has gone by, that then shall the aspect of those who are condemned be afterwards changed, and the glory of those who are justified. For the aspect of those who now act wickedly shall become worse than it is, as they shall suffer torment. Also as for the glory of those who have now been justified in Thy law, who have had understanding in their life, and who have planted in their heart the root of wisdom, then their splendour shall be glorified in changes, and the form of their face shall be turned into the light of their beauty, that they may be able to acquire and receive the world which does not die, which is then promised to them. . . . They shall behold the world, which is now invisible to them, and they shall behold the time which is now hidden from them, and time shall no longer age them. For in the heights of that world shall they dwell, and they shall be made like unto the angels, and be made equal to the stars. And they shall be changed

into every form they desire, from beauty into loveliness, and from light into the splendour of glory."

The author of these chapters, which were written (according to Canon Charles) between A.D. 70 and 90, had come to the conclusion, like St. Paul, that "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of heaven." At the same time he clung to the old doctrine of the Pharisees that the earth would give back her dead unchanged. He reconciled the two beliefs by supposing that the dead would rise in their "natural" bodies, in order that they might be recognised and judged, and then the bodies of the righteous would be transformed into what Enoch calls "garments of glory" and St. Paul "spiritual bodies."

Unknown, probably, to this writer, his problem had been solved some twenty or thirty years before in a bolder and more satisfying manner. For St. Paul had renounced the Pharisaic doctrine that flesh and blood would inherit the kingdom, and affirmed that the spirits of the faithful would be invested in new bodies, adapted for the new life, which would rise at the last trump from the graves of the earthly bodies.

The comparison by which the Apostle illustrates his doctrine has been a subject of controversy since the time of Calvin. What is meant by the sowing in verses 42–44? Is it the process which places the living body in the world or the dead body in the grave? Both parties (*e.g.* the Bishop of Ely and Canon Charles) appeal to the phrases used in those verses; but neither party can make out a clear case.

For St. Paul's antitheses are not scientific, but rhetorical. Admirable for giving a general impression, they do not exactly describe the body either in life or in death. Some of them apply to the living body, others to the corpse. If it be necessary to choose between the two alternatives which have been presented, we must be guided by the general sense of the chapter, and decide in favour of Canon Charles's interpretation, which has many distinguished advocates. But is it necessary? I venture to suggest another way.

Both parties to this discussion have assumed that St. Paul used the images of sowing and seed with a clear and consistent meaning. Had St. Paul been an ordinary Western writer the assumption would be justified. But he was neither Western nor ordinary: and in nothing does he show more independence of ordinary rules than in his use of metaphors. Let us take three examples.

Rom. vii. 1–4.—A Jew is the wife of the Law. Now a wife is bound to her husband as long as he lives, but if he dies is free to marry another. We expect the Law to die and free the Jew. On the contrary, The Jew dies (mystically), and is thereby freed from the Law (the first husband) and able to be the bride of Christ.

1 Thess. v. 2 and 4 (according to W. and H.'s text).—"The day of the Lord so cometh *as a thief* in the night. . . . But ye are not in darkness, that day should overtake *you as thieves*." Here is a complete reversal of the image.

2 Cor. ii. 14–16.—The prisoners who are led in a

Roman triumph suddenly become (like the altars of incense on the road) a savour "from death unto death" "in them that are perishing," *i.e.* to the prisoners themselves.

These examples are enough to show that what St. Paul cared for in a metaphor was its power to illustrate some relation; and the relation once suggested, he applied the metaphor in any way that pleased him. Does not this suggest the true explanation of 1 Cor. xv. 35–44? By "sowing" in the first instance St. Paul meant burial, and by "the seed" the corpse. But when he came to contrast the seed and that which grew out of it (the spiritual body), he changed his point of view, and (to the great advantage of the general argument) contrasted the spiritual body not with the corpse, but with the living natural body.

We are, however, brought back to the dead body in ver. 52. When St. Paul writes "the dead shall be raised incorruptible" (ver. 52) he uses words which admit of only one interpretation. The new (spiritual) bodies will in some way spring from those which lie buried in the earth. And though he does not describe the process, he gives an indication. For when he reminds us that a seed of corn must decay before the new plant can grow out of it, he implies that there is something in the human body which corresponds to that germ in the corn-seed, which is the source of new life. What is this something? He does not tell us directly, but we may infer his meaning from other passages. In 2 Cor. v. 5 he speaks of the "earnest of the Spirit" (ἀρραβών),

which is the guarantee of the new life; and in Rom. viii. 23 of the "firstfruits of the Spirit" (ἀπαρχή), which is the pledge of the "redemption of the body." The gift of the Divine Spirit, he seems to teach, implants a principle of life which will manifest itself one day in a new body.[1] The old Jewish fancy had found security for continuity, between the mortal body and the body of the resurrection, in a bone of the spine which was said to be indestructible. St. Paul's conception is infinitely nobler and more spiritual, and it links the natural body which dies to the spiritual body which rises. As we shall see, it involved a fresh difficulty, of which he soon became aware.[2] But it solved the immediate problem, offering a triumphant picture of a regenerate personality which has never failed to appeal to the Christian consciousness.

The main criticism upon this section (pp. 110–18) has already been answered in Chapter V. and only one remains which needs to be examined. A page of very confused misrepresentation leads up to the following statement:

What does this involve? It involves, so far as I can see, the belief that all those who have died since the moment of their Saviour's death have at their death received this "spiritual body," and that all those who died before the moment of His death did not receive, and never will receive, this "spiritual body." In other words, we are asked to believe that at one particular moment in the history of the world the actual character

[1] This implies that St. Paul did not look for a resurrection of any but the faithful.

[2] See *infra*, pp. 97 *sqq.*; Charles's *Eschatology*, p. 453.

of death was changed. For if there was no change and if those who died before Christ received this "spiritual body," Christ's priority as the "firstfruits" is done away (*B. and C.*, p. 102).

The writer has here confused (*α*) my account of the conception of man's resurrection which St. Paul held at a particular moment, (*β*) my account of St. Paul's belief about Christ's Resurrection, and (*γ*) my own beliefs, which must depend not upon St. Paul's views at one stage, but upon the total effect of his teaching. It would try the patience of the reader too much if I were to unravel the whole tangle. So I content myself with making four observations.

(1) As St. Paul never mentions the bodily resurrection of any but those who have "the earnest of the Spirit," there is every reason to suppose that he retained the belief in which he was brought up, that the righteous alone would rise. So the only "change in the actual character of death" which he conceived was the gift of the privilege of resurrection to the few faithful believers.[1] And how can this be called a change in the character of *death*?

(2) As to the past, there is no evidence that he devoted much thought to the questions involved. We may, however, fairly conjecture that he continued to believe that the righteous Israelites of the past would rise again. For it appears that he regarded them as having, in a sense, believed in Christ by anticipation (cf. Gal. iii. 6–9).

[1] See Charles's *Eschatology*, p. 449.

(3) The special case of the faithful Israelites does not affect St. Paul's general view that the death of Christ did change, not "the actual character of death," but the prospects of the faithful after death, since they would receive the "spiritual body."

(4) The words "we seem to be asked to believe" imply that the view which follows is mine. That is not the case. I was stating St. Paul's opinion at a particular stage, not the conclusion to which his teaching and other considerations have led me. I should be surprised to find that any instructed Christian now believed exactly what St. Paul did when he wrote the first epistle to the Corinthians.

(C) "For we know that if the earthly house of our tabernacle be dissolved, we have a building from God, a house not made with hands, eternal, in the heavens. For verily in this we groan, longing to be clothed upon with our habitation which is from heaven: if so be that being clothed we shall not be found naked. For indeed we that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened; not for that we would be unclothed, but that we would be clothed upon, that what is mortal may be swallowed up of life. Now He that wrought us for this very thing is God, who gave unto us the earnest of the Spirit. Being therefore always of good courage, and knowing that, whilst we are at home in the body, we are absent from the Lord (for we walk by faith, not by sight); we are of good courage, I say, and are willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be at home with the Lord. Wherefore also we make it our aim, whether at home or absent, to be well-pleasing unto Him. For we must all be made manifest before the judgment-seat of Christ; that each one may receive

the things *done* in the body, according to what he hath done, whether *it be* good or bad" (2 Cor. v. 1–10).

"But ye are not in the flesh, but in the spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you. But if any man hath not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His. And if Christ is in you, the body is dead because of sin; but the spirit is life because of righteousness. But if the Spirit of Him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwelleth in you, He that raised up Christ Jesus from the dead shall quicken also your mortal bodies through His Spirit that dwelleth in you. . . . For we know that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now. And not only so, but ourselves also, which have the firstfruits of the Spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting for *our* adoption, *to wit*, the redemption of our body. . . . For whom he foreknew, he also foreordained to *be* conformed to the image of His Son, that He might be the firstborn among many brethren: and whom He foreordained, them He also called: and whom He called, them He also justified" (Romans viii. 9–11, 22, 23, 29–30).

"For to me to live is Christ, and to die is gain. But if to live in the flesh,—*if* this is the fruit of my work, then what I shall choose I wot not. But I am in a strait betwixt the two, having the desire to depart and be with Christ; for it is very far better: yet to abide in the flesh is more needful for your sake" (Phil. i. 21–24).

"That I may know Him, and the power of His resurrection, and the fellowship of His sufferings, becoming conformed unto His death; if by any means I may attain unto the resurrection from the dead. Not that I have already obtained, or am

already made perfect : but I press on, if so be that I may apprehend that for which also I was apprehended by Christ Jesus. . . . For our citizenship is in heaven ; from whence also we wait for a Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ : who shall fashion anew the body of our humiliation, *that it may be* conformed to the body of His glory, according to the working whereby He is able even to subject all things unto Himself " (Phil. iii. 10–12, 20–21).

The period of six months or more which followed the dispatch of the first epistle to the Corinthians was for St. Paul filled with poignant experiences, such as by their intensity might well produce the effect of long years. He paid a second visit to Corinth, not recorded in the Acts, whose stormy and distressing character is reflected in 2 Cor. x.–xiii.[1] He had not yet recovered from the painful impression caused by the disloyalty of the church at Corinth, when the opposition of Jews and heathen at Ephesus culminated in the violence of a mob from which he barely escaped with his life. The vivid narrative of Acts xix. 23–41, which describes the tumult, helps us to understand the tone of 2 Cor. i.–ix., which was written from Macedonia soon after his escape from Ephesus and his recovery from the illness which resulted from the strain.[2] We can almost feel how his sensitive nerves were trembling with the excitement of a danger which had taught

[1] It is at least highly probable that these chapters are part of the letter described in 2 Cor. ii. 1–5, the rest of which have been lost. See G. H. Rendall, *The Epistles of St. Paul to the Corinthians* (Macmillan, 1909).

[2] The illness is not mentioned expressly, but it is a natural inference from 2 Cor. iv. 16–v. 10.

him how unlikely it was that he would survive to witness the Advent.

In such times men's minds move rapidly. In a brief space, and almost unconsciously, St. Paul re-adjusted his view of the future to fit the prospect that he would be dead and buried long before the summons of the last trumpet sounded, which he had expected to hear with his mortal ears. There is some reason for supposing that he was helped by studying the book of Wisdom, which would naturally be much quoted by Apollos who was with him at Ephesus. The influence of that book is generally recognised in Romans,[1] which was written very shortly after the second epistle to the Corinthians; but whether it may be traced in the latter epistle is a matter of dispute. For my own part I think the resemblance in thought between 2 Cor. v. 1–3 and Wisdom iii. 1–5 is most naturally explained by supposing that St. Paul had just been studying the book of Wisdom. He does not, of course, accept the whole doctrine of the Alexandrian writer, who teaches the immortality of the soul without any kind of bodily resurrection. He shrinks from the idea that his own spirit might be for a time "naked." But he approaches very near to the main thought of Wisdom iii. 1–5, which tells how "the souls of the righteous are in the hand of God, and no torment shall touch them," when he takes it for granted (2 Cor. v. 8) that "to be absent from the body" is "to be at home with the Lord."

[1] See Sanday and Headlam's notes on Romans i. and ix. Also The Wisdom of Solomon (Holmes) in Charles's edition of the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament.

There is another path by which he might naturally be led in the same direction. However satisfying the conception described on page 91 might be when the Advent was believed to be very near, so soon as the possibility of a long interval was admitted some inherent difficulties would present themselves. St. Paul tells us in 2 Cor. v. how he was oppressed by the thought of his soul being "naked" for a space: and according to the Pharisaic doctrine it must remain naked in Sheol from the hour of death to the hour of resurrection: not asleep, but conscious of its condition. And then his Greek converts might ask him questions which were not easily answered. "Have you not taught us," the disciple might say, "that the Spirit acts upon the spirit of man rather than upon the body? When you spoke of the body being the temple of the Holy Ghost, did you not mean that the Holy Ghost dwelt in the body just because it was united with the spirit of the man? How, then, can you picture the earnest of the Spirit lying dormant in the dead body, from which the man's spirit has departed, perhaps for many years?" By some such tentative reasoning, of which we can easily imagine various stages, the disciple and his master might reach a new conclusion. The vital principle, which is the germ of the spiritual body, must surely inhere in the spirit, not in the body.[1] And if so, must it not begin to exercise its power, so soon as the spirit parts from the body, by developing the new "spiritual body" which is to be the fit expression of the man's regenerate

[1] So Swete, *The Holy Spirit in the New Testament*, p. 217.

personality, just as the "natural body" is the expression of the "earthy" man? If that be so,[1] the connection between the natural body and the spiritual body is not that the latter grows out of the former, but that both alike are expressions of the same personality in different stages.[2] The germs of this thought are really involved in the phrases which have already been quoted (pp. 85, 86) from the book of Enoch—"garments of glory" and (bodies or garments of) "shining light." But neither in Enoch nor in St. Paul do we find the new body conceived as growing (so to speak) round the spirit. Rather it is pictured as something ready in its completeness with which the spirit is all at once invested.[3]

In the second epistle to the Corinthians St. Paul employs two images to describe this new "body." It is a "house not made with hands," long ago prepared for him in the heavens: or it is a garment which will be brought to earth, either to clothe the spirit after death, or to enwrap the body and soul of the living man at the Advent. Thus "clothed" or "clothed upon," St. Paul now sees himself ready to pass into the presence of the Lord, because he is one of those whom God has "foreordained to be conformed to the image of His Son" (Rom. viii. 29). Thus the fear, which used to oppress him, of a period during which his spirit would be "naked" (2 Cor. v. 3) is done away. He need no longer think of

[1] See Canon Charles's *Eschatology*, p. 453.
[2] See Streeter, *Immortality*, pp. 113, 114.
[3] See pp. 103, 104 *infra*.

his body in the grave and his spirit in Sheol: for as he says twice over (2 Cor. v. 6 and 8), to be at home in the body is to be absent from the Lord, and to be absent from the body is to be at home with the Lord. (*ἐκδημῆσαι ἐκ τοῦ σώματος* is the same thing as *ἐνδημῆσαι πρὸς τὸν κύριον.*) And again in Phil. i. 23 "to depart" is "be with Christ," since both alike are contrasted with "to abide in the flesh." (*τὸ ἀναλῦσαι καὶ σὺν χριστῷ εἶναι* is set against *τὸ ἐπιμένειν τῇ σαρκί.*)

The image of a heavenly garment which St. Paul used to describe the spiritual body could not fail to kindle the imagination of readers in after years. One remarkable development of it, which appeared very early in the third century, at once illustrates its meaning and shows the danger which attends the use of imagery. The so-called "Hymn of Bardaisan," which may or may not be the work of that eminent Gnostic, is an allegory representing the history of the soul. It is seen first in heaven, clad in its Robe, the spiritual body, Stripped of that Robe it descends to earth and is dressed in an "unclean Egyptian garb" (the natural body). Dwelling among men, it forgets the mission on which it was sent, to secure the Pearl of great price, but, reminded by a revelation, a letter from the King, it performs its task. Then it returns to its home, leaving the unclean Egyptian garb behind. Immediately on returning to heaven it meets the Robe (the spiritual body), which has grown to match its growth, and is ready waiting to greet and enwrap it. So soul and body are once more united. I

quote a few of the concluding stanzas from Professor Burkitt's translation :

My Robe, with scarlet tunic that I wore of old,
Thither to me my parents from the Hyrcanian heights
Sent by the hands of them whose care had kept it safe :
Its fashion in my childhood I remembered not,
But when we faced each other, lo, its form was mine !

Myself I saw as in a glass before my eyes,
For we were two, and yet in one similitude ;
Just as those seneschals that kept it were alike—
Two figures from one mould, bearing the royal stamp
Of Him who had returned my well-loved treasure safe.

Even as I looked it moved, as moves a living thing,
When I beheld it turn about as if to speak,
And heard it cry aloud to them that carried it :
" There is the Paladin, for whom they reared me up !
Have I not known that with his toils my stature grew ? "

With kingly mien it moved towards my willing grasp,
It seemed for me impatient in its guardian's hands,
And I—I longed to run to meet it in the way !
I put it on and with its beauty was adorned,
And cast the bright-hued tunic round me over it.

Thus clad, they led me up unto the Palace gate,
I bowed my head before my Father's Majesty—
I had obeyed, and He His promise had performed—
Among the Satraps as a Prince I took my place,
For me He welcomed, and with Him I ever dwell.

The Gnostic allegory has not only stiffened St. Paul's fleeting imagery into a definite form, but has added an alien element by assuming the pre-existence of the soul. Yet it is probably the best existing commentary upon his words in 2 Cor. v. ; for the very exaggerations help the modern reader to grasp the main conception.

There is no indication that the Apostle departed

from the belief which is set forth or implied in 2 Cor. v. and in the first chapter of Philippians. But as the two references to the resurrection in the third chapter of Philippians have been quoted as evidence that he still held the earlier belief (*B. and C.*, pp. 127, 128) I must here examine them and endeavour to show their true meaning.

In Phil. i. 21–24 St. Paul had expressed his confidence that for him to die was to be at once with Christ. As he wrote on he suffered a natural reaction of feeling. The same distrust which once caused him to write "Lest, after I have preached to others, I myself should be rejected" (1 Cor. ix. 27) now suggested the doubt, "What if, after all, the resurrection is not for me?" That doubt inspired the words "*if by any means* I may attain unto the resurrection from the dead." These words may be explained in two ways. The resurrection here meant may be the mystical resurrection in this present life, which has been described above (pp. 66, 67). That interpretation is strongly supported by the words in Phil. iii. 10, "becoming conformed to His death" (*συμμορφιζόμενος τῷ θανάτῳ αὐτοῦ*), which can hardly be explained as referring to literal death, for it would imply crucifixion. Or perhaps St. Paul, like other Pharisees, regarded the resurrection of the body as contingent,[1] being reserved for those

[1] Bishop Lightfoot, in his note on this passage, explains "the resurrection from the dead" to mean "the final resurrection of the righteous to a new and glorified life," as distinguished from the general resurrection of the dead, which he thinks he finds in 1 Cor. xv. 42. If he is right my argument would not be affected. But the more I study St. Paul the more inclined I am to believe that he did not look for a bodily resurrection for men in general.

only who had received the "earnest of the Spirit." In either case the words represent a wave of despondency, which caused the Apostle for a moment to doubt his own "election." But as to the mode of the resurrection they imply nothing.

The wave of despondency is soon succeeded by a wave of hope. Suppose, after all, he should survive to witness the Advent, so that his living body would be changed! That is the plain meaning of verses 20 and 21: "Our commonwealth is in heaven; from whence we wait for a Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ; who shall fashion anew the body of our humiliation, that it may be conformed to the body of His glory." Neither of these passages—neither the fear of being denied the resurrection for which he longed, nor the hope of surviving so as not to need it—indicates any withdrawal from the position which is taken up in 1 Cor. v. and Phil. i. 23.

To the view which is sketched in the last seven pages, and was summarised in thirty-two lines of *The Faith of a Modern Churchman* (pp. 25 and 26), twenty-seven pages of *B. and C.* have been devoted. Unfortunately the argument is not easy to follow, being confused partly by the repeated alternation of the two distinct, though related, questions, How did St. Paul conceive the resurrection of Christ? and, How did he conceive his own resurrection? and partly by a good deal of irrelevant writing. I have endeavoured to pick out the criticisms which matter most; and to those only shall I direct attention.

Three passages of *B. and C.* (pp. 102–4, 112–15, 122–25) deal with the interpretation of 2 Cor. v. 1–9 and Romans viii. 11 and 23.[1] As the passages are closely related, the exposition would have been easier to follow if it had been continuous. In the remarks which I have to make I shall take the three passages together. I think it will appear that in each case the interpretation given in *B. and C.* is erroneous.

On page 104 there is a new translation of 2 Cor. v. 1–4, which is intended to correct the errors of the Revised Version. For "not for that we would be unclothed, but that we would be clothed upon" (which is not very clear, but fairly intelligible) we are to read "*because we do not wish to put it off, but to put on over it the upper garment.*" Though that is a little clearer, it exaggerates the inadequacy of St. Paul's metaphor. I should be glad to believe it to be more accurate. For if ἐνδύσασθαι and ἐπενδύσασθαι are to be translated as middles—"put it on," "put on over it"—instead of passives, the change supplies a fresh argument in favour of the view already put forward (pp. 97, 98), that St. Paul in his latter years believed that the connection between the natural and the spiritual body lay in their both being the expression of the same personality, not in transformation of substance. For that which "puts off" the natural body and "puts on" the spiritual must plainly be the soul or spirit, which wears first one garment and then the other.

Continuing, we read, *For verily in this we groan,*

[1] The text of these passages is given on pp. 93, 94.

longing to put on over it our habitation which is from heaven, if so be that having put it on we shall not be found naked.

It is difficult to believe that St. Paul wrote anything so flat as the latter clause, which simply means "if indeed clothes prevent us from being naked." This result is attained by rendering εἴ γε καὶ in a very questionable way, and treating ἐνδύσασθαι as a mere repetition of ἐπενδύσασθαι, though much has been made of the distinction between the two.

Delitzsch, following the Vulgate, translates, "although if we are (merely) clothed (with the spiritual body) we shall not be found naked."[1] Thus rendered, the sentence, instead of being a meaningless interruption, adds a new thought which fits the context. What it expresses is this. St. Paul, though he ardently desires to receive the spiritual body while yet alive ("be clothed upon"), is satisfied that in any case he will not be left a "naked" spirit, because at death he will be "clothed," that is, invested with the spiritual body.[2]

One more point, which has been raised in connection with this passage, requires attention.

[1] "Ob zwar wir auch, mittelst Bekleidung (nicht Ueberkleidung) den himmlischen Leib gewonnen habend, nicht nackt werden erfunden werden."

[2] εἴ γε καὶ is not, I believe, ever found in classical authors, and St. Paul only uses it twice, so there is no certainty about its meaning. In Gal. iii. 4 it means "if indeed," implying that it is unlikely. That would make no sense here. But εἴ γε καὶ may be built up in two ways—εἴ γε (= if indeed), with an emphatic καὶ added, or εἰ καὶ (= although), with an emphatic γε inserted. The Vulgate *si tamen vestiti* corresponds in this latter, which I believe to be right. There is nothing in St. Paul's literary habits to prevent us from supposing that he used εἴ γε καὶ in two different ways.

In 2 Cor. v. 1 St. Paul writes: "For we know that *if* the earthly house of our tabernacle be dissolved, *we have* a building from God, a house not made with hands, eternal, in the heavens." The Bishop comments thus:

St. Paul does not use the future tense, "we shall have," or "we shall acquire," or "we shall put on." He uses the present tense—"we have." The house not made with hands is a present possession here and now while he is in the body. It is "laid up for us in heaven" (Col. i. 5). But the time of the actual appropriation of it, though this cannot be doubtful, is here undefined (*B. and C.*, p. 112).

Though the time is undefined, the whole context (it appears to me) implies that it follows without any considerable interval. Suppose a man to say, "If my town house is burnt down, I have a house in the country." Would any of my readers maintain that he meant to be satisfied with the knowledge that his country house existed, but had no idea of making immediate use of it? The Bishop seems to think so, for by "though this cannot be doubtful" he plainly means that the time of the appropriation coincides with the general resurrection.

His appeal is to Greek grammar. *St. Paul does not say "when the earthly house of our tabernacle is dissolved," but "if it be dissolved."*

To settle the question of grammar, let us recall our schooldays. When we began to write Greek sentences, we were taught that if a future condition is expressed by ἐάν with the subjunctive the sequel

or conclusion must be expressed by a future indicative. So we learned to write :

ἐὰν τοῦτο ποιήσῃς δώσω σοι δραχμήν,
If you do this, I will give you a shilling :

and we knew that this sequel was always understood to follow soon, if not instantly. When we had advanced a little farther, we found that there were apparent exceptions to this rule : for the future indicative might be replaced by a present, an optative with ἄν, or some other forms, *provided always that they conveyed the same future sense.* Professor Goodwin (*Moods and Tenses*, §§ 444, 445), after giving a number of examples of such substitution, sums up thus : " It will be seen that the apodosis here may consist of *any future expression.*" It follows that any phrase which is substituted for the future indicative " expresses future time, to denote what will be the result if the condition of the protasis is fulfilled." Having read this, we were able to write :

ἐὰν τοῦτο ποιήσῃς, ἥδε κεῖταί σοι δραχμή.
If you do this, here is a shilling ready (literally laid up) for you.

We did not suppose that this form of promise was any less definite than the other. We were saved from that mistake by Goodwin's examples, which show that, on the contrary, the present serves for an emphatic and immediate future.

Unless, therefore, there is some express statement in the context which suggests an interval, St. Paul's sentence must be understood to indicate that the

"actual appropriation" will follow without delay. Far from finding any such suggestion in the context, we read in the next three verses how St. Paul dreads the thought of being left "naked" for ever so short a time. The interpretation, therefore, which the Bishop attacks appears to me to be required not only by the general sense of the passage, but by the rules of Greek grammar.

In Romans viii. 11 we read, "He that raised up Christ Jesus from the dead shall quicken also your mortal bodies through His Spirit that dwelleth in you." The conventional explanation refers this to the resurrection, explaining that "mortal" means "dead," and "quicken" is an equivalent for "raise." To this explanation there are two fatal objections. One is that mortal (*θνητὰ*) never means "dead." (The dictionary has no trace of such a meaning.) The other is that, if it did, the clause "through (or because of) His Spirit that dwelleth in you" would have no meaning. For, according to St. Paul's teaching, the Spirit dwells in the human spirit or the whole man, not in the dead body. We have seen just now (pp. 97, 98) how he abandoned a view which might be taken to imply that the *ἀῤῥαβὼν τοῦ πνεύματος* dwelt in the body.

Therefore, following Bernhard Weiss and others, I believe the true explanation to be this: God gives the Christian the earnest of the Spirit, which is a guarantee of his resurrection. That is, the Spirit given to the living man is a principle of life which secures that his spirit either (adopting the Bishop's

view of ἐνδύσασθαι) shall have power, when the body dies, to clothe itself in a spiritual body; or (following the Vulgate) shall be clothed in the spiritual body which is prepared for it in heaven.

In Romans viii. 23 the words "we ourselves groan within ourselves waiting for our adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body," is parallel [1] to 2 Cor. v. 2: "In this we groan, longing to be clothed upon with our habitation which is from heaven." For that reason, and because of the context, it has nothing to do with the resurrection, but expresses the hopes of those who expect to survive till the Advent. They have the firstfruits (ἀπαρχή, which is an equivalent for ἀρραβών) of the Spirit, which is the guarantee that, at the Lord's appearing, their bodies will be redeemed, that is, transformed.

In explaining what I believe to be his mistaken view of the passage, the Bishop (*B. and C.*, p. 125) uses a curious expression. "*In St. Paul's view the body will not finally be laid aside* (*i.e. at death*) *as of no account. The body will be emancipated from corruption.*" Now though it might perhaps be said of Lazarus, or any other who was revived after two or three days, that his body was "emancipated from corruption," there is no intelligible sense in which it could be said of a body that has decayed—*e.g.* of St. Paul himself. But in the proper sense it can only apply to the bodies which are transformed at the Lord's appearing. So the Bishop himself bears testimony in favour of my interpretation.

[1] See Gifford's note, *ad loc.*

St. Paul wrote in the first epistle these words (1 Cor. xv. 3 ff.) :

" I delivered unto you first of all that which also I received, how that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures ; and that He was buried ; and that He hath been raised on the third day according to the Scriptures ; and that He appeared to Cephas."

Six months later, when he wrote the second epistle, this fundamental passage, if the theory under consideration is true, ought to have been rewritten thus :

" I deliver not unto you now that which I received ; and that which I received not do I now deliver unto you, how that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures ; and that ' the spiritual body came down from heaven to clothe His soul in the hour of death ' ; and that He was buried ; and that He appeared to Cephas " (*B. and C.*, pp. 108, 109).

I feel obliged to comment upon this paragraph, not because of its intrinsic importance, which few readers will rate highly, but because it is an example of a style of criticism which the Bishop of Ely much affects. Four times at least it appears in *B. and C.* (pp. 20, 109, 172, 178). On the first occasion it is compared to Euclid's method of *reductio ad absurdum* : and in each case the absurd result evidently gives pleasure to the author. It seems, therefore, desirable to inquire what claim these arguments have to so scientific a title.

This method of argument is the invention of mathematicians ; and (especially in geometry) it leads to valuable results, but only on condition that the proper limitations be observed. The essence of the method may be described as follows. You

assume for the moment the truth of a statement which you wish to disprove. You then show that, when combined with some other statements which are certainly true, it leads to a conclusion which is obviously absurd. Since all the other statements used are indisputable, you rightly infer that the assumption was false. The validity of the argument plainly depends upon your certainty that no disputable statement has been introduced in the process—nothing, in fact, but axioms and the results of previous propositions.

The abstract character of geometrical reasoning makes it easy to observe these conditions : for every step can be tested at once and with certainty. But when an attempt is made to use the method of *reductio ad absurdum* in arguments of another kind there are all sorts of pitfalls. It is so easy and so natural to introduce, instead of an axiom or an admitted fact (such as " the external angle of a triangle is equal to the two interior angles "), a statement of the adversary which has passed through your own mind, and been more or less altered, or a conclusion which you have drawn from something which he said. Any such misinterpretation vitiates the whole process : and the absurdity of the conclusion does not prove the falsity of the assumption.

Another variety of this method is to take an inference which you have drawn from the adversary's words, and substitute it for one of a familiar series of propositions, thereby producing a sense of incongruity. The paragraph quoted above is a good example. In a mock version of St. Paul's familiar

words, for one sentence, "that He hath been raised, etc.," there is substituted a sentence which has been modelled on one of mine, but applied in a sense in which I neither applied it nor intended to apply it. A more elaborate example of the same principle of distortion is to be read on pages 178–81, where a whole creed is constructed on similar lines.[1]

When the form of a *reductio ad absurdum* is thus used without the spirit, the result is not demonstration, but parody.

On pp. 109–111 of *B. and C.* there is an argument which may be summarised thus:

St. Paul repudiated the charge of fickleness which was made against him because he changed the date of his intended visit to Corinth (2 Cor. i. 17). He solemnly affirmed to the Galatians that he was speaking the truth about certain past events, and to the Romans that his affection for his own people was sincere (Gal. i. 20; Rom. ix. 1). In speaking to the elders of Ephesus and in writing to the Corinthian church, he declared that he had taught them in sincerity and without reserve, as in the sight of God (Acts xx. 20, 27; 2 Cor. ii. 17). Therefore it is impossible that he can ever have changed his belief on any religious subject.

Can any one imagine a more complete *non sequitur*? A man may be conscientious about keeping an engagement, truthful in relating what he remembers of past events, and frank in teaching what he believes to be true at the time (I say *at the time*, for nothing more can fairly be deduced from the texts); and

[1] See *infra*, p. 133.

yet he may possess a keen intellect and an inspiring faith which are all the time leading him on to new and higher conceptions of God and the Universe. And it is a simple fact that St. Paul's change of opinion on some subjects is indisputable.

One example will suffice. When he wrote the epistles to the Thessalonians and the first epistle to the Corinthians, St. Paul had no doubt that the Advent would take place in his own lifetime.[1] The eleventh chapter of Romans, on the other hand, predicts that Israel will be converted before the Advent, and that their conversion will in part result from the conversion of the Gentile world. When "the fulness of the Gentiles be come in," then "all Israel shall be saved" (vv. 25, 26). And the whole process is part of the divine plan. "For God hath shut up all into disobedience, that He might have mercy upon all" (ver. 32). Sanguine as St. Paul undoubtedly was, who will venture to assert that at the age of fifty or so he expected all this process to be completed in his own lifetime?

In Ephesians i. 10, probably written five or six years later, the prospect seems even more remote. The Advent is included as part of "a dispensation of the fulness of the times, to sum up all things in Christ."

It is needless to enlarge on this subject. The fact is plain that St. Paul possessed in an eminent degree that power of spiritual growth which is characteristic of the prophet. And spiritual growth involves changes of opinions.

[1] See 1 Thess. iv. 14; 1 Cor. xv. 51, 52.

ADDITIONAL NOTE I

On the Greek and Aramaic Words which are rendered by "Resurrection"

The wider use of the word "resurrection," to express the new life in a spiritual body, without implying that the mortal body is raised from the grave, is challenged by the Bishop of Ely (*e.g. B. and C.*, p. 153) and by many others, as if it were a modern heresy. I am indebted to my friend Canon Kennett, the Regius Professor of Hebrew at Cambridge, for the means of proving that, on the contrary, it is in accordance with very early usage, perhaps in Hebrew, certainly in Aramaic and in Greek.

The two Greek verbs which express "resurrection" are ἀνίστασθαι and ἐγείρεσθαι. Both of them in the LXX represent the Hebrew verb קוּם. Now קוּם has two meanings, (*a*) to rise, and (*b*) to endure or stand. The former is the usual meaning in the Old Testament. But in some cases it certainly means endure. In Isa. xl. 8 we read, "The word of our God shall *endure* for ever" ("rise" would make nonsense). In Dan. iv. 26 (Aramaic 23), "Thy Kingdom shall endure [R.V. be sure] unto thee" renders תְּקוּמָה. And in Dan. vi. 26 (Aramaic 27) the adjectival form קָיֵם expresses enduring, permanence: "He is the living God and endureth [R.V. is stedfast] for ever." It is worth noting that in the Targums (Onkelos as well as Jonathan) קוּם is used to translate חי (Hebrew for "living"), not only when it is predicated of God (as in Num. v. 21, 28, Deut. xxxii. 40, Josh. iii. 10, Jer. iv. 2, etc.), but also when it refers to men—*e.g.* Deut. iv. 4, "Ye . . . are alive"; 2 Sam. xii. 22, "While the child was yet alive." "Comparing these translations," writes Canon Kennett, "with the Aramaic of Daniel, I have no doubt that the adjective קָיֵם was in our Lord's day equivalent to חי."

That קוּם continued to be used in the sense of "endure," both in Aramaic and in Rabbinic, is shown by Kimchi's commentary, written *circa* 1200 A.D., on Ps. i. 5, which the R.V. renders: "The wicked shall not stand (יָקֻמוּ) in the judgment, nor sinners in the congregation of the righteous." Kimchi explained it thus: "He means to say that in the day of judgment, *i.e.* in the day of death, there will not be for them a resurrection (תקומה)." And again: "In the case of the righteous, at their

death, there will be for them a resurrection: but in the case of the wicked there will not be for them a resurrection, but *their soul will perish with the body* in the day of death. And he (the Psalmist) says "in the congregation of the righteous," because when the righteous dies *his soul* with the souls of the righteous ones enjoys felicity in the glory above." Here it is quite evident that by the word rendered "resurrection" Kimchi means the continued life of the spirit, and not a rising of the body in any sense.

Hatch's Concordance to the LXX shows that ἐγείρεσθαι and ἀνίστασθαι are used to render קוּם in all its meanings. The correspondence is further illustrated by such passages as Matt. iii. 9, Luke iii. 8, where ἐγεῖραι τέκνα echoes the phrase of Gen. xxxviii. 8, ἀνάστησον σπέρμα,—Hebrew הָקֵם זֶרַע. And the addition ἐκ τῶν λίθων τούτων is instructive: for plainly the stones were not spoken of as seed or the germs.

The above considerations have an important bearing upon the interpretation of a recorded saying of our Lord which has caused much difficulty. In Mark xii. 26 we read, περὶ δὲ τῶν νεκρῶν ὅτι ἐγείρονται, οὐκ ἀνέγνωτε ἐν τῷ βίβλῳ Μωσέως, ἐπὶ τῆς βάτου, πῶς εἶπεν αὐτῷ ὁ Θεὸς λέγων, Ἐγὼ ὁ Θεὸς Ἀβραάμ, καὶ Θεὸς Ἰσαάκ, καὶ Θεὸς Ἰακώβ; οὐκ ἔστι Θεὸς νεκρῶν, ἀλλὰ ζώντων. The conventional explanations are either lame or self-contradictory, for admittedly the patriarchs had not "risen" in the bodily sense. But since ἐγείρονται undoubtedly represents some form of the Aramaic word קוּם, and קוּם in the time of our Lord often meant the endurance or survival of the spirit, it is at least possible that our Lord was speaking, not of any bodily "resurrection," but of the survival or quickening of the spirit. If that was His meaning, the saying at once becomes luminous, and the argument convincing. It is also consistent with the teaching of the Pharisees, who held that all souls survived, though only the righteous were destined to enjoy a bodily resurrection (see above, p. 78). For, as commentators (*e.g.* Gould, *ad loc.*) point out, Jesus here speaks of the "resurrection" of the dead generally, and not simply of the righteous dead.

If that conclusion be correct, we are bound to ask the further question, Is it not probable that Greek-speaking Jews often used ἐγείρεσθαι and ἀνίστασθαι to describe not a resurrection of the body, but the preservation of the spirit and its emancipation from Sheol, which is sometimes called the spiritual resurrection?

The conception of Sheol as a prison house beneath the earth would help to make such an expression natural. If that be the case, the often repeated phrases *ἠγέρθη ἐκ νεκρῶν*, *ἤγειρεν αὐτὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν*, may, at least sometimes, bear a different meaning from that which is usually assigned to them.

ADDITIONAL NOTE II

The general statement, made on p. 72, that throughout 1 Thess. iv. 13–18 and 2 Thess. i. 6–10 St. Paul is using the familiar and almost technical language of the Jewish apocalyptic writers, will not seem exaggerated to any reader who will examine the references given below. It is the Greek text of the Old Testament, not the Hebrew, which must be consulted, for the LXX was St. Paul's Bible. For the reader's convenience I follow the order of the text of Thessalonians:

1 Thess. iv.

13. *τῶν κοιμωμένων*.—Job xiv. 12, 1 Kings xvi. 6, 2 Macc. xii. 45.

14. *ὁ θεὸς . . ἄξει σὺν αὐτῷ*.—Dan. vii. 13, Zech. xiv. 5, Enoch i. 9, 4 Ezra vii. 28 (for the sense, not the exact word).

15. *οἱ περιλειπόμενοι . . οὐ μὴ φθάσωμεν τοὺς κοιμηθέντας*.—Cf. 4 Ezra xiii. 24 (later than St. Paul), "Know therefore that those who survive (to that time) are more blessed than those that have died."

16. *ἐν σάλπιγγι θεοῦ*.—Compare the following:

Exod. xix. 16, *φωνὴ τῆς σάλπιγγος ἦχει μέγα*.

Zech. ix. 14, *κύριος ἐν σάλπιγγι σαλπιεῖ*.

Isa. xxvii. 13, *ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐκείνῃ σαλπιοῦσι τῇ σάλπιγγι τῇ μεγάλῃ*.

4 Ezra vi. 23, "And the trumpet shall sound aloud, at which all men shall be struck with sudden fear."

αὐτὸς ὁ κύριος . . καταβήσεται. Cf. Ex. xix. 11, *καταβήσεται κύριος ἐπὶ τὸ ὄρος*.

οἱ νεκροὶ ἐν χριστῷ ἀναστήσονται. Compare the following:

Dan. xii. 2, *πολλοὶ τῶν καθευδόντων . . . ἀναστήσονται*.

Isa. xxvi. 19, *ἀναστήσονται οἱ νεκροί*.

Isa. lxvi. 14, *τὰ ὀστᾶ ὑμῶν ὡς βοτάνη ἀνατελεῖ*.

4 Ezra vii. 32, "The earth shall restore those that sleep in her, and the dust those that rest therein."

2 Baruch l. 2. See *infra*, p. 87.

Sibylline Books, iv. 180. God himself shall fashion again

the bones and ashes of men, and shall raise up mortals once more as they were before. (*Circa* A.D. 80.)

Canon Kennett points out that all these three phrases are curiously illustrated by the Targum on Zech. xiv. 4: "At that time Jehovah will take in his hand the great trumpet, and will blow therewith ten blasts to bring the dead to life, and He will be revealed in His might at that time on the Mount of Olives." The date of this passage in the Targum is unfortunately uncertain.

1 Thess. iv.

17. *εἰς ἀπάντησιν τοῦ κυρίου.*—Cf. Ex. xix. 17, *εἰς συνάντησιν τοῦ θεοῦ.*

2 Thess. i.

6. *ἀνταποδοῦναι* is a characteristic word of the late additions to Isaiah. See Isa. xxxiv. 8, xxxv. 5, lix. 18, lxiv. 4.

7. *τοῖς θλίβουσιν ὑμᾶς θλῖψιν.*—Isa. xix. 20, *διὰ τοὺς θλίβοντας αὐτούς.*

ἐν πυρὶ φλογός.—Dan. vii. 9, Isa. lxvi. 15, Enoch lxi. 6, Rev. i. 14; each of which has *φλόξ πυρός.*

8. *τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν θεόν.*—Jer. x. 25, Ps. lxxviii. 6.

9. *ἀπὸ προσώπου τοῦ κυρίου καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς δόξης τῆς ἰσχύος αὐτοῦ* is quoted verbatim from Isa. ii. 10, only omitting *τοῦ φόβου* after *προσώπου.*

10. *ἐνδοξασθῆναι.*—Isa. xlix. 3, Ezek. xxviii. 22, xxxviii. 23. *ὅταν ἔλθῃ.*—Isa. xxxv. 4, xl. 10, lix. 20, lxvi. 15.

[*ἔρχομαι*, of which *ἥξω* is the usual future, is regularly used of God coming down *to earth.*]

ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐκείνῃ.—See the prophets *passim.* Almost all late eschatological additions to the prophets begin with this phrase, *e.g.* Zech. xii. 9, *ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐκείνῃ ζητήσω ἐξᾶραι πάντα τὰ ἔθνη τὰ ἐρχόμενα ἐπὶ Ἰερουσαλήμ.*

The cumulative effect of these quotations is irresistible. The writer, whose language is so largely drawn from Apocalyptic sources, must have had the general scheme of the Apocalyptic writers present to his mind. The two passages which bear this character must be interpreted in the light of that scheme, unless (which is not the case) some words of his expressly exclude it.

A reference to Box's excellent edition of Isaiah will show the reader that all the verses of Isaiah named above (except xl. 10 and perhaps xlix. 3) are of late date and mostly of Apocalyptic character.

CHAPTER VI

BISHOP CHASE'S THEORY EXAMINED

THE last portion of the fourth chapter of *B. and C.* (pp. 129–55) is intended to be constructive. It professes *to give a connected view of St. Paul's teaching about the Resurrection*, and incidentally to set forth the beliefs of *those who follow the teaching of St. Paul* in the present day. Unfortunately these pages are not very easy reading: for confusion is caused both by a digression directed against an opinion of Canon Charles (which begins on page 141 and loses itself, like a river in the sand, somewhere about page 146), and also by the assumption, which has not been made good, that St. Paul's views and those of Bishop Westcott are identical. Having already touched upon the question at issue between the Bishop and Canon Charles, I shall confine myself here to examining the five sections of the chapter which are constructive. They may be briefly summarised as follows:

(*A*) (pp. 129–32). St. Paul never changed his view about the Resurrection.

(*B*) (pp. 132–40). St. Paul's conception of the Resurrection of Christ.

(*C*) (pp. 145–8). St. Paul's conception of the resurrection of men.

(*D*) (pp. 149–52). The changes in St. Paul's conception of the Resurrection.

(*E*) (pp. 152–5). The unchanging belief of the Church.

I will endeavour to be brief: but the subject is one which demands care and patience.

(*A*) On pages 130 and 131 is a statement which must be quoted almost *in extenso*. For the sake of clearness the references, which are interwoven with the Bishop's text, are here placed in a footnote.

There does not exist a particle of evidence to show that St. Paul in the slightest degree changed his position in regard to the four fundamental beliefs which dominate his doctrine of the Resurrection. These four fundamental beliefs are as follows:

(1) *The Lord's Resurrection is the pledge and the pattern of the resurrection of those who are His.*

(2) *The Resurrection will take place at the Lord's future coming.*

(3) *The Resurrection will be the resurrection of the body.*

(4) *The Resurrection will not be the reconstitution of the body of flesh, but the Resurrection will essentially involve a "change," whereby from the earthly body, as from a seed, there will arise a spiritual body.*[1]

The first of these propositions is common ground, and therefore need not be discussed.

As to the second I would point out that the only reference to epistles of the third period is Phil. iii. 20.

[1] The references given are as follows:
(1) 1 Thess. iv. 14; 1 Cor. vi. 14, xv. 12 ff., 20, 23; 2 Cor. iv. 14; Rom. viii. 11; Phil. iii. 21.
(2) 1 Thess. iv. 15 f.; 1 Cor. xv. 23, 52; **Phil. iii. 20.**
(3) 1 Cor. vi. 13, xv. 35–54; **Rom. viii. 11, 23; Phil. iii. 21.**
(4) 1 Cor. xv. 51; **2 Cor. v. 4; Rom. viii. 11, 21, 23; Phil. iii. 21.**

The same is true of the third: for I believe it has been proved (*supra*, pp. 107, 108) that Rom. viii. 11, 23, are in no way relevant.

As to the fourth, it has been shown (pp. 103–8) that the Bishop's interpretation of 2 Cor. v. 4 and Rom. viii. 11, 21, 23 is not tenable. So the only available reference to epistles of the third period is Phil. iii. 21.

Obviously, therefore, the Bishop's whole argument turns upon the interpretation of Phil. iii. 20, 21, which appears in all four of his lists. Let us examine this hard-worked passage once more, though it has already been considered (pp. 101, 102) in part: "For our citizenship is in heaven, from whence we also wait for a Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ; who shall fashion anew the body of our humiliation, that it may be conformed to the body of His glory."

For the sake of any reader who is ignorant of Greek it must be pointed out that "fashion anew" represents a Greek word (μετασχηματίσει) which has only one possible meaning. It cannot mean "reconstitute" a dead body, but only "transform" a living one. Therefore, if words have any reliable meaning, this passage describes the expectation of living men that they will survive to see Christ descend from heaven, and that thereupon their living bodies will be changed. There is nothing which suggests the resurrection of the dead; nothing which is even consistent with the supposition that it is intended.

So the pillar on which the whole argument rests proves to be a broken reed. Not one single quotation has been produced which bears out the claim that the epistles of St. Paul's third period give the

same teaching about the Resurrection which we find in the earlier epistles. I submit, then, that the Bishop has quite failed to make out his case. I do not believe that any candid reader of my last chapter (V) will agree with him that *there does not exist a particle of evidence to show that St. Paul in the slightest degree changed his position, etc.*, for that chapter offers a good deal of evidence (not new, but long familiar to scholars) which must be either admitted or rebutted. And now all the witnesses which were brought forward against it (2 Cor. v. 4, Rom. viii. 11, 21, 23, Phil. iii. 20, 21) have, on being cross-questioned, given their testimony in its favour.

(*B*) *St. Paul, then, from first to last believed that the Lord's body was raised from the grave* (*B. and C.*, p. 137).

On page 131 of *B. and C.* we read that one of St. Paul's four fundamental and unchangeable doctrines is *The Lord's Resurrection is the pledge and the pattern of the Resurrection of those who are His.* And on page 100, *Without doubt the metaphor of the firstfruits implies that all things essential in the future Resurrection will be after the pattern of Christ's Resurrection.* In other words, the Bishop affirms that from first to last St. Paul believed the resurrection of men to be *in all essentials* the same as that of Christ. One essential is unquestionably the nature and origin of the " spiritual body " ; whether it develops out of the body which is buried in the grave, or is laid up in heaven as a garment ready for the time of death. The complete failure of the

Bishop's argument, which I have shown in the last section, involves the admission that when he wrote 2 Cor. v. the Apostle did hold the latter view. On his own principles, therefore, the Bishop must admit that St. Paul, at that time, had also changed his conception of Christ's Resurrection. But I do not wish to hold him strictly to that conclusion, because for reasons already given (pp. 59, 60) I regard it as possible, and even probable, that St. Paul's conception of Christ's Resurrection, though it changed in the same direction, did not change in the same degree as his conception of man's resurrection. I feel bound, therefore, to examine the arguments which are stated on pages 132–40 of *B. and C.*

The first is the strongest. In nearly all his epistles St. Paul uses phrases such as " Jesus was raised from the dead " and " God raised Him from the dead." But it is not so strong as it appears at first sight. For the history of the Creeds (as we read in Chapter II of *B. and C.*) shows how both churches and individuals continue to repeat the same phrase with a changed meaning. And on pages 113–15 reasons have been given for doubting whether the conventional physical interpretation of those phrases is always correct.

Much prominence is naturally given to the passage (1 Cor. xv. 1–10) in which St. Paul enumerates the " appearances " of the Lord, which ends " and last of all He appeared to me also." But I venture to doubt whether the right conclusion has been drawn from St. Paul's words. Obviously St. Paul meant his readers to understand that the appearance to

himself was of the same nature as the other appearances which he mentions. Now of his own experience we have three accounts in the Acts (ix. 3–6, xxii. 6–9, xxvi. 13–15), whose differences of detail emphasise the points in which they agree. They all mention a voice which the Apostle heard, and a light which shone from heaven. But none of them suggests, or leaves room for, the sight of a human form. In what sense, therefore, did St. Paul use the word "appeared" (ὤφθη)? Perhaps, like some other writers, he uses the word as a general term to include various kinds of perception. At any rate, it is hard to reconcile this language with the belief that the stories which he had heard from Peter and James involved such marked evidence of the presence of a human body as we find forty or fifty years later in the Gospels. On the whole, therefore, this passage not only fails to support the Bishop's contention, but rather points the other way.

Another argument (*B. and C.*, p. 137) is so unsubstantial that it is difficult to meet. When St. Paul describes baptism as a mystical burial and resurrection he uses *the two correlative* phrases "buried with Him," "raised with Him," much as he does in Rom. vi. 3. The Bishop claims that this *demonstrates* that St. Paul still believed that our Lord rose in the flesh. That contention is only possible to one who ignores the mystical element in St. Paul's epistles, which I have tried to describe in my fourth chapter (*supra*, pp. 66–8). No reader who thinks that description sound will be inclined to follow the Bishop in this flight of exegetical imagination.

I submit, then, that in this section the Bishop has failed to make good his contention. He has not proved that St. Paul held the doctrine of 1 Cor. xv. either when he wrote to the Thessalonians or when he wrote to the Philippians and Colossians.

It still remains for us to examine the following pages, 135–40, in which several threads of argument are brought together—or, should I say, threads of assumption? He takes it as proved:

(1) That St. Paul heard from St. Peter and St. James and others a narrative of the Resurrection practically identical with that contained in the Gospels.

(2) That St. Paul accepted this wholly, and never changed his view of it.

(3) That St. Paul's unchangeable view is expressed in 1 Cor. xv.

(4) That the teaching of St. Paul, of the Gospels, and of the Church generally, is rightly summarised in three paragraphs which are quoted from Bishop Westcott's *Revelation of the Risen Lord*, supplemented by some sentences of Bishop Chase.

I will not weary the reader by restating the position of St. Paul, and contrasting it with the summary. But it seems essential to compare the Bishop's statement with the Gospel narratives. So I place four typical texts side by side with four characteristic sentences from the modern formula:

"And they came and took hold of His feet and worshipped Him."—St. Matt. xxviii. 9.

"[The Resurrection] is the reconciliation of the antithesis which exists for us between matter and spirit."—*B. and C.*, p. 138.

"See My hands and My feet, that it is I Myself: handle Me and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see Me having."—St. Luke xxiv. 39.

"And they gave Him a piece of a broiled fish. And He took it, and did eat before them."—St. Luke xxiv. 42, 43.

"Then saith He to Thomas, Reach hither thy finger, and see My hands: and reach hither thy hand, and put it into My side."—St. John xx. 27.

"In His resurrection the Father fashioned His body anew."—*B. and C.*, p. 138.

"He was no longer subject to the laws of the material order, to which His earthly life was previously conformed."—*B. and C.*, p. 139.

"In our earthly life the spirit is manifested through the body: in the life of the Risen Christ the Body is manifested through the Spirit."—*B. and C.*, p. 139.

Which is nearer to the Gospel narratives, the above quotations on the right hand, or the fourth Article of the Church of England?—

"Christ did truly rise again from death, and took again His body, with flesh, bones, and all things pertaining to the perfection of man's nature; wherewith He ascended into heaven, and there sitteth, until He return to judge all men at the last day."

Bishop Harold Browne, a former Bishop of Ely, in the eleventh edition (1882) of his well-known *Exposition of the Thirty-Nine Articles* (pp. 98–107), maintains that the words of the article, though "strong," express the teaching of the Gospels and of the Fathers of the early Church. We have his authority, at any rate, for refusing to identify the Gospel narrative with the mystical vision of *those who follow the teaching of St. Paul* (*B. and C.*, p. 137).

Yet my own sympathies are rather with Bishop Westcott than with Bishop Harold Browne. Through the veil of mystical paradox which the former loved so well, I seem to get glimpses of a belief which is

not far from my own. That sympathy gives me the better right to assert that his teaching cannot be reconciled with Church tradition or with the earlier of St. Paul's epistles. But his teaching does appear to me to approach nearly to what we may reasonably suppose that St. Paul believed when he wrote the epistles of the third period.

(*C*) In this section seven quite irrelevant pages (141–7) are followed by an important paragraph which must be quoted in full :

We do not believe that the idea of the Resurrection of the body involves the idea of a final collection of the scattered particles which together at the hour of death made up the body, or that the only real identity consists in a physical identity of material. If we make the attempt, it is only a provisional attempt, to put our belief into our own words, they will, I think, shape themselves somewhat thus. In our Resurrection, as in Christ's Resurrection, we expect that the antithesis between spirit and matter will be done away. For the full realisation of the personality of each man we believe that God, at the time of the "restitution of all things," will bestow upon each man a spiritual body, so intimately related to the natural body, so truly, in that world of realities, corresponding to the natural body in this world, that it must be said to have its origin in it, as the full corn in the ear has its origin in the seed (*B. and C.*, p. 148).

This statement of the Bishop's own belief deserves our serious consideration. Three questions naturally suggest themselves. Is it consistent with itself ? Is it consistent with St. Paul's teaching ? Is it

consistent with its author's teaching about the Resurrection of our Lord ?

Let us first examine the last sentence of the paragraph. Part of it reads almost like a summary of what I have written above (pp. 97, 98) : for the main point is that the new body, like the old, is the expression [1] of the man's personality, and that fact, not any *physical identity of material*, is the connection between the two bodies. Neither here nor elsewhere is it suggested that there is any identity of form. If the spiritual body derives neither its substance nor its form from the natural body, why *must it be said to have its origin in it?* The Bishop's own reasoning leads to the opposite conclusion. For if both bodies have the same origin—being both expressions of the same personality—clearly neither can be said to have its origin in the other.

Secondly, is this theory consistent with St. Paul's teaching ? The first part of the sentence just quoted would, I believe, be quite Pauline but for the words *at the time of the restoration of all things*. Without those words it expresses St. Paul's belief during the third period. But their insertion compels us to picture St. Paul (to use his own phrase) " naked " for near nineteen hundred years, and perhaps for thousands more—and that is clean contrary both to 2 Cor. v. and Phil. i. (see *supra*, pp. 100–5). On the other hand, the Bishop's statement is not con-

[1] The Bishop's exact phrase is " God will bestow . . . a spiritual body." But he has already explained (*B. and C.*, p. 119) that *the spiritual body is a growth* and *the spiritual body is a gift* are two ways of expressing the same thing.

sistent with St. Paul's teaching in 1 Cor. xv.: for his first sentence, taken together with the last, denies the physical connection between the natural and the spiritual bodies which is implied throughout that chapter, and definitely expressed in the image of the seed.

The third question is perhaps the most important. Is this view consistent with his own view of the Resurrection of our Lord? He has laid it down that *in all things essential* the Lord's Resurrection is the pattern of ours. He would not surely deny that the relation between the natural and the spiritual bodies is one of the essential things. I ask, then, since in man's case he denies that the two bodies are related by *a physical identity of material*, what becomes of the story of the Empty Tomb? There would seem to be no room for it in his philosophy.

There is another question which some readers would like to ask. What is meant by saying *we expect that the antithesis between spirit and matter will be done away*? It is a favourite phrase of the Bishop's.[1] The sound of it is impressive: it has an air of philosophic reflection. But I have not yet discovered any one else who can solve the riddle of its meaning.

(*D*) *St. Paul, consistent throughout in his conception of the Resurrection, enriches it with new thoughts* (*B. and C.*, p. 148).

[1] See *B. and C.*, pp. 138, 148, and *The Gospels in the Light of Historical Criticism*, p. 48. Elsewhere the Bishop speaks of the resurrection as "the synthesis of matter and spirit."

The enrichments, as described in the next three pages, would by most people be classified as changes of some importance. But as the argument of these pages is based upon what I believe I have shown to be a wrong interpretation of two verses (Rom. viii. 11 and Phil. iii. 21), this part of the theory can without difficulty be withdrawn.

(*E*) *The Church's belief in the Resurrection of Christ has always been the belief that on the third day He rose again from the dead, and that His Resurrection was a resurrection of His body.*

As a general statement this is quite true. But it needs to be supplemented by one observation. A reference to pp. 22, 23, 123, 124 will show that by "His body" the Church has generally meant something quite different from the meaning which the Bishop of Ely assigns to it. If the tradition of the Church as a whole is the standard, he must confess himself to be a heretic.

The blunt question must be asked, and must be faced, whether this [the modernist] *use of the word Resurrection is morally defensible.*

A sufficient answer will, I think, be found on pages 113–15 where it is shown that this use of the word—or something very like it—was common among the Jews of the first century and for several centuries afterwards, and that a very important saying of our Lord can hardly be explained without assuming that He endorsed it.

CHAPTER VII

FAITH OR FEAR?

THE fifth chapter of *B. and C.* is intended to show that the "symbolical interpretation" of two clauses in the Creed is dishonest in the individual and subversive of the Church which allows it. Having dealt with the general question in my first chapter, I shall here confine myself to examining three particular statements.

The Church holds the historic faith as expressed in the Apostles' Creed. The statements of that Creed it affirms not because they are the statements of the Creed, but because they are based upon the authority of the New Testament (*B. and C.*, p. 161).

There is nothing to indicate whether "the Church" here means the Church of England or the Christian Church at large. Yet the distinction is important in this case. For if the Church of England be meant, the first sentence is untrue: since admittedly her members do not hold three of the clauses in the natural and original sense. And if the Christian Church as a whole be meant, the second sentence is untrue, since the Roman and Greek Churches, the great majority of Christians, follow the tradition of early times in regarding the Creeds as primary authorities and the New Testament as only second-

ary. Here is a dilemma. It is for the Bishop to choose upon which horn he prefers to impale himself.

The "spiritual truth" substituted for the historical event rests, as I have already pointed out, on no authority: it is the pious fancy of a few scholars in these later years. Its acceptance dislocates the Creed. And it implies that it is no part of the divine purpose to redeem and glorify matter, and that matter therefore may be disregarded as worthy of contempt (*B. and C.*, p. 171).

"Authority" is a word which bears many meanings; and unless it is defined, discussion is futile. But I presume that here it means the pronouncement of bishops: and in that limited sense the statement carries conviction. It helps to confirm a criticism which I have heard made upon the whole of *B. and C.*—that, proposing to appeal to reason, it substantially rests upon the claim to authority.

It is a great mistake to suppose that the modernist view is "the pious fancy of a few scholars." It is held by very many thousands who lay no claim to the title of scholar. I have myself been astonished to learn, from the letters addressed to me by strangers of all kinds who have read my little manual, how widespread the movement is in the Church of England.

"*Its acceptance dislocates the Creeds.*" This is really just the reverse of the fact. In proof thereof I venture to quote a few paragraphs from *The Faith of the Apostles' Creed*, which was published a few days before *B. and C.*:

"The phenomenal, or 'factual,' cover of the belief

has worn out, and a process of reinterpretation has ensued. In this process we have throughout maintained fidelity to the religious conception that was expressed in words that are no longer literally true to us." . . .

"Yet as regards the Creed of the Church as a whole something has undoubtedly been lost. For the process of reinterpretation has been consciously applied only to some of its clauses. We have taken account of the change in our outlook only here and there, as regards this or that clause, which we were fain to think lay not at the centre, but only at the circumference of our main beliefs. And some have done so in respect of one clause and others in respect of another. So that the unity of the Creed has been destroyed, and we are now at sixes and sevens as regards its use. We want a new perspective in which to see it as a whole." . . .

"The process of reinterpretation has already gone too far for any lesser remedy. It has undoubtedly destroyed for ever the unity of the Creed as a work of art, if the central and dominant clause, and the clause 'He rose again from the dead,' are to be held to be incapable of similar reinterpretation. It would be as if we took a picture of some old-world hero, painted from the life, and left our central figure in the costume of the period, but painted in afresh the attendants and the background and all the properties, to be characteristic of the fashion and manner of life of the twentieth century. So it is with the Creed. We are left with something incoherent, incongruous, all out of focus and perspective, if we cannot apply to the whole the principle of interpretation which we allow ourselves to apply to parts" (Bethune-Baker, *The Faith of the Apostles' Creed*, pp. 34, 35, 39, 40).

It implies that it is no part of the divine purpose to redeem and glorify matter, and that matter therefore may be disregarded as worthy of contempt.

The Bishop has been misled by his studies of early heresies into a complete misapprehension of the views of those modern Churchmen whom he condemns. The Gnostic contempt for matter is a thing of the long past. Men and women of our day, brought up in an atmosphere which is penetrated by modern science, are not in the least inclined to despair of matter; and only a few students are even interested in the old controversies about it. What determines their critical attitude towards some clauses in the Creed is the conviction that historical statements ought not to be affirmed unless they are supported by adequate evidence, and the knowledge, derived from modern literary studies, that it is the tendency of popular religion to enshrine truths of thought in tales of wonder which are not in the strict sense historical.

There is only one more point which must be mentioned. Pages 178–81 of *B. and C.* offer an interesting combination of two forms of argument—parody and the protest against "the thin end of the wedge." The Bishop imagines a set of Churchmen who should make a new claim to interpret the Apostles' Creed in a way which amounts to a denial of the Christian Faith as a whole: and he draws up a fancy statement on their behalf. At the same time, by quoting in footnotes three sentences from Mr. Emmet's *Conscience, Creeds, and Critics*, as the basis of part of his parody, he insinuates that this

imaginary *group of men* has already arisen in the persons of Mr. Emmet and his friends. The insinuation involves a complete misrepresentation of their position.[1]

So far as this statement is a parody, the main objections to it have already been stated on pp. 136, 137, and I will only add that this particular parody seems to me exceptionally unfair. But in so far as it involves the " thin end of the wedge " argument, it deserves serious attention.

In the world of matter, and of material interests, the argument is a sound one. It is easier, to express the same thing in another way, to keep a door shut than to prevent it from being forced when it is ajar. But what is involved when a claim in the region of thought is met by the assertion that it is the thin end of the wedge? Let us compare two ways of dealing with such a claim as that which has given occasion to the Bishop's book.

The Roman Church has met all such claims with a peremptory negative. The Bull *Pascendi gregis* of 1907 is a typical example of the attitude of the Papacy towards modern thought. It forbids all priests and theological students (unless they are " safe " men who have a special licence) to study any philosophy later than that of Thomas Aquinas, or to make any approach to Biblical criticism. (The standard treatise, which is studied in all Jesuit seminaries, still bases the whole theological system upon the traditional story of Adam's creation and fall.) The ground of the prohibition is simple.

[1] See *supra*, p. 111.

Catholic tradition is complete, indisputable, and sacred: and therefore the Church will not allow any hand even to touch the fence which surrounds it. However absurd we may find it, that is a logical position for those who accept the premises which the Pope is able to assume. And he has the power to say—

"Sic volo, sic jubeo, sit pro ratione voluntas."

What of a Church whose rulers argue, "If we allow this advance to be made, some one else may want to go farther in the same direction, or in another?" By using that argument it has given up the Roman position. It has virtually admitted that the advance has much to be said in its favour. And, moreover, he who bases the refusal of a claim upon the fear that another claim may be made, to which he must object, is refusing to deal with the question on its merits: he is not logical, but opportunist. Yet a man who is quite sure that the second question can be answered with certainty in the negative need not regard it when dealing with the first. If he allows the fear of the second question being raised to influence a decision which ought to be determined by truth alone he shows a lack of faith in the power of truth. In other words, the argument of the thin end of the wedge is a sceptical argument. He who employs it admits *ipso facto* that he is not sure of his ground. That is the essential weakness of the parody with which the Bishop of Ely concludes his long discussion.

CHAPTER VIII

THE QUESTION OF AUTHORITY

THE first chapter of *B. and C.* criticises a letter which (as already mentioned in the preface) I wrote in May 1918. In order to make the points clear to the reader, I am obliged to begin with a short account of some matters to which the letter refers.

Towards the end of April 1914 nine petitions and memorials, which had reference to the Creeds, were presented to the Upper House of Convocation. One of these, which the Archbishop of Canterbury described as "obviously the weightiest of the memorials presented to us," signed by some forty clergymen of undoubted eminence—retired bishops, deans, professors, head masters, and other scholars—contained the following sentence:

"While asserting without reserve our belief in the Incarnation and Resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ, we submit that a wide liberty of belief should be allowed with regard to the mode and attendant circumstances of both."

A second petition in identical terms, but with two additional clauses referring to the Kikuyu controversy, was signed by the members of the Council of the Churchmen's Union, of whom I was one.

Another and very different memorial contained these words :

" For the sake, therefore, of ourselves and our people we are driven to ask our spiritual fathers, first, to repudiate the claims of some clergy to reject the miracles of our Lord's birth of a Virgin and the actual Resurrection of His body from the tomb, because we believe that these truths lie at the very centre of our faith, and that the statements of the Bible and the Creeds with regard to them are perfectly plain and unambiguous."

To all these memorials the Bishops replied collectively by a resolution couched in rather general terms, as follows :

" Inasmuch as there is reason to believe that the minds of many members of the Church of England are perplexed and disquieted at the present time in regard to certain questions of faith and of Church order, the Bishops of the Upper House of the Province of Canterbury feel it to be their duty to put forth the following resolutions :

" 1.—We call attention to the resolution which was passed in this House on May 10th, 1905, as follows :

" ' That this House is resolved to maintain unimpaired the Catholic Faith in the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation as contained in the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds, and in the *Quicunque Vult,* and regards the Faith there presented, both in statements of doctrine, and in statements of fact, as the necessary basis on which the teaching of the Church reposes.'

" We further desire to direct attention afresh to the following resolution which was unanimously

agreed to by the Bishops of the Anglican Communion attending the Lambeth Conference of 1908 :

" ' The Conference, in view of tendencies widely shown in the writings of the present day, hereby places on record its conviction that the historical facts stated in the Creeds are an essential part of the Faith of the Church.'

" 2.—These resolutions we desire solemnly to reaffirm, and in accordance therewith we express our deliberate judgment that the denial of any of the historical facts stated in the Creeds goes beyond the limits of legitimate interpretation, and gravely imperils that sincerity of profession which is plainly incumbent on the ministers of Word and Sacrament. At the same time, recognising that our generation is called to face new problems raised by historical criticism, we are anxious not to lay unnecessary burdens upon consciences, nor unduly to limit freedom of thought and inquiry, whether among clergy or among laity. We desire, therefore, to lay stress on the need of considerateness in dealing with that which is tentative and provisional in the thought and work of earnest and reverent students."

The Bishops plainly intended this resolution to meet, in some degree, the wishes of both parties. They formally granted the demand of the last-quoted memorial by condemning " the *denial* of any of the historical facts." They could do so the more easily because the modernists do not *deny*, but (as I have said above, p. vi) claim to be excused from affirming where the evidence is not convincing. On the other hand, though they indicate that their own feeling was against symbolical interpretation, what they

said about "freedom of thought and inquiry," and the allowances to be made for "earnest and reverent students," amounted to an admission of the claim made in the first memorial. So it was understood by the Archbishop, who said:

"I do not myself see anything in the actual wording of . . . the weightiest of the memorials . . . which is necessarily inconsistent with what we are now declaring. . . . They ask for reasonable liberty, and we propose that they shall have that liberty; but there are limits to that liberty, and we have tried in some measure to define it.'

Mariners who steer between Scylla and Charybdis sometimes find that there is a rock in midstream which they have forgotten. So it was with the Bishops. In their anxiety about other matters they forgot that, in the case of the Creeds, the phrase "historical facts" is an ambiguous term: and the exposure of that ambiguity greatly diminished the value of their declaration.

Though not entirely satisfied with the Bishops' pronouncement, liberal Churchmen regarded it as on the whole favourable to their claims; and there the matter rested until the claim was repeated in the manual which I published in March 1918.[1] As a matter of courtesy, I sent a copy to the Bishop of Ely. In the course of a month I received the following letter from him; and he sent copies to the press:

[1] See preface, pp. v and vi.

"THE PALACE, ELY,

"*April 26th*, 1918.

"MY DEAR CANON GLAZEBROOK,

"I feel it is my duty as Bishop of the Diocese formally to write to you and to tell you that I am unable to admit the 'claim' which, as I understand you, you put forward in your recently published book, *The Faith of a Modern Churchman* (p. 78), that the two clauses of the Apostles' Creed—'Born of the Virgin Mary' and 'The third day He rose again from the dead'—can legitimately be 'interpreted symbolically.' That this position of mine, to which I have thus given expression, is not simply that of an individual Bishop is clear from the following facts. The Bishops of the whole Anglican Communion assembled at the Lambeth Conference of 1908 passed the following resolution: 'This Conference, in view of tendencies widely shown in the writings of the present day, hereby places on record its conviction that the historical facts stated in the Creeds are an essential part of the Faith of the Church.' Again, on April 30th, 1914, the Upper House of the Convocation of Canterbury passed a Resolution in which they 'solemnly reaffirmed' the Resolution of the Lambeth Conference just quoted.

"I am bound also to call attention to a later paragraph in your book (p. 79), in which you use these words: 'Similar questions arise about the corresponding clauses in the Nicene Creed. And there are others concerning the more elaborate Christology of that Creed, which involve more issues than can be raised in these pages.' What further 'claim' may be covered by the last sentence I do not know.

"When I had read your book, of which you kindly

sent to me a copy on February 18th,[1] I made up my mind that it would be my duty, however painful to me, publicly as Bishop to state my opinion about the claim which I understand you to make as to the interpretation of the clauses of the Apostles' Creed. It was very distasteful to me as a student publicly to challenge your conclusions without at the same time publicly challenging the arguments by which you endeavour to justify your conclusions, including your statements and your exegesis of passages in the New Testament. I have, however, found it hitherto impossible by reason of the pressure of necessary work to give proper attention to this task; and I now realise that in the immediate future I shall be unable to devote sufficient time to it. Since continued silence on my part in regard to the 'claim' advanced in your book as to the interpretation of the Apostles' Creed is liable to be misunderstood by many, I have decided that my right course is without further delay to address to you this letter and to make it public in the *Diocesan Gazette*.

"I am,
"Yours very sincerely,
"F. H. ELY."

My reply, which was printed in *The Times*, was as follows:

"MY DEAR LORD BISHOP,

"I should be discourteous to you and untrue to myself if I did not openly reply to the open letter which you have addressed to me concerning my little book. In so doing I shall observe the same limits which you imposed upon yourself. There are, as you say, two roads by which you might advance

[1] This is a mistake, though of no importance. The book was not published till March.

to challenge my position—that of reason and that of authority; and you have chosen the way of authority, as the simpler and more direct. It is, therefore, on that side only that I now come to meet you.

"But first I must serve as your guide, lest you should aim at a wrong objective. For by quoting a sentence without its context you have seriously misrepresented my position; and you would not have done so unless you had misunderstood it. The very next line to the sentence which you extract from page 78 is a footnote which indicates that it is the resurrection *of the flesh* that modern Churchmen claim may without heresy be regarded as symbolical. On the same page reference is made to Chapter III, where (pp. 27–29) belief in the resurrection of a 'spiritual body' is several times emphasised, yet your letter has naturally given some readers, who were not acquainted with the book, the false impression that I have denied the reality of our Lord's Resurrection.

"You quote two episcopal pronouncements, of 1908 and 1914, to which I will refer in turn. Before doing so, however, let me remind you that our Church does not regard even Bishops in council as infallible. The 21st article says with respect to General Councils that 'they may err, and have erred, even in things pertaining to God.' But, as I wrote in my book, 'Our own Church is for us the body of Christ'; and therefore the joint pronouncements of her leaders have a strong claim upon our obedience. As they cannot be obeyed until they are understood, loyalty required me to examine the meaning of the declaration which, as you say, has been twice affirmed.

"I. What did the Bishops of the Lambeth Con-

ference mean by saying that 'the historical facts stated in the Creeds are an essential part of the Faith of the Church'? The natural interpretation is this: 'Each clause which mentions an event as having taken place in historical time must be accepted by the faithful as a literal statement of a fact.' That was certainly the view taken by the Bishops in general and by nearly all Christian people for some fifteen hundred years. And yet it may be doubted whether that is what the Lambeth Conference meant to express. For the Bishop of Oxford, who represents the opinion of many Bishops, has written (*The Basis of Anglican Fellowship*, p. 20), 'When I say "He descended into hell," and also when in a more general sense I say "He ascended into heaven, and sitteth," etc., I confess to the use of metaphor in a historical statement, because the historical statement carries me outside the world of present possible experience, and symbolical language is the only language that I can use.' In other words, those three clauses must be interpreted symbolically. As to one of them, Bishop Westcott wrote long ago (*Revelation of the Risen Lord*, p. 180), 'The physical elevation was a speaking parable, an eloquent symbol, but not the truth to which it pointed or the reality which it foreshadowed. The change which Christ revealed by the Ascension was not a change of place, but a change of state, not local but spiritual. Still, from the necessities of our human condition, the spiritual change was represented sacramentally, so to speak, in an outward form.' The Bishop of Oxford has expressed the same idea in language even more involved. If I may translate their meaning into plain English, it is this: 'Our Lord could not, for astronomical reasons of which the disciples were ignorant, physic-

ally ascend into heaven. But, in order to give them a right conception of His change of state, He rose to a moderate height in the air, and then so veiled Himself behind a cloud that they believed Him to have gone right up to the vault of the sky.' You have yourself quoted and endorsed Bishop Westcott's words (*The Gospels in the Light of Historical Criticism*, p. xxxi), and elaborated his theory in a tract written for the National Mission (*The Ascension of the Lord Jesus*, pp. 14, 15). Whether the theory be sound or not, by presenting it you have joined with its author in claiming that one of 'the historical facts stated in the Creeds' must be interpreted symbolically. You could not, indeed, do otherwise; for since the days of Copernicus no literal interpretation has been possible to men who realise what is involved in rejecting the old geocentric astronomy.

"Since three clauses of the Apostles' Creed are by many Bishops explained to be symbols of spiritual truth, not statements of historical fact, I am forbidden to understand the Lambeth declaration in its natural sense. How, then, is it to be understood? Only one way seems open. We must take 'the historical facts' to mean such of the statements as appear, in the light of our present knowledge, to be historical: and regard the other statements as symbolical. The declaration, thus qualified, is one to which we can all subscribe. But it proves to be a rule of lead, which is not of much use for bringing us into line. For the question immediately arises, Are there only three clauses which may be interpreted symbolically? The Bishops as a body have given no answer. But the Bishop of Oxford has proposed a test by which the symbolical may be distinguished from the historical. The symbolical, he says, is all that 'carries me outside the world of

present possible experience.' If this test were accepted, the claim to interpret the Virgin Birth and the resurrection of the flesh symbolically would be undeniable. But neither this test nor any other has been accepted by the Bishops in Council, nor have they enumerated the clauses which must be taken in the literal sense. Since they have left it doubtful how far their principle of symbolical interpretation may be carried, their followers have in some measure to judge for themselves.

" II. The Upper House of Convocation in April, 1914, reaffirmed the Lambeth pronouncement. Their action cannot be understood without recalling the circumstances. The Bishop of Southwark had presented a memorial which was signed not only by its authors, the Council of the Churchmen's Union, but also by some forty clergymen of undoubted eminence—retired bishops, deans, professors, head masters, and other scholars. It contained the following paragraph:

" ' While asserting without reserve our belief in the Incarnation and Resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ, we submit that a wide liberty of belief should be allowed with regard to the mode and attendant circumstances of both.' The Bishops, in reply, after reaffirming the Lambeth declaration, concluded with these words: ' At the same time, recognising that our generation is called to face new problems raised by historical criticism, we are anxious not to lay unnecessary burdens upon conscience, nor unduly to limit freedom of thought and inquiry, whether among clergy or among laity. We desire, therefore, to lay stress on the need of considerateness in dealing with that which is tentative and provisional in the thought and work of earnest and reverent students.'

"I need not presume to estimate the relaxation which is implied in those two sentences, for the Archbishop of Canterbury did so in concluding the debate. These are his words: 'I do not wish to be dogmatic about it, but I do not myself see anything in the actual wording of what is obviously the weightiest of the memorials that were presented to us, that to which the Bishop of Southwark yesterday called attention, which is necessarily inconsistent with what we are now declaring. Put the two documents, the Petition and the Resolution, side by side, dismissing all thought of the men who are supporting either of them, and I confess that I find nothing in the two that is radically or essentially inconsistent. They ask for reasonable liberty, and we propose that they shall have that liberty; but there are limits to that liberty, and we have tried in some measure to define it.'

"Considering the ambiguous character of the Lambeth declaration, the definite claim made in the memorial, the qualified answer of Convocation, and the reconciling comment of the Primate, I think it cannot fairly be urged that I have defied episcopal authority in writing the words to which you draw attention, and the two chapters (III and VII) upon which they depend for their meaning.

"I remain,

"Yours very sincerely,

"M. G. GLAZEBROOK."

"*May 17th*, 1918."

The following letter appeared in *The Times* a few days later:

"*To the Editor of 'The Times'*

"SIR,—

"In reference to Canon Glazebrook's letter to me, which appears in *The Times* to-day, I ask

you generously to allow me space to say that I hope, so soon as in these exacting days is possible, to fulfil the promise clearly implied in my original letter to the Canon (which appeared in *The Times* of May 13th), and publicly to challenge the arguments by which in his book, *The Faith of a Modern Churchman*, he endeavours to justify his conclusions. At the present time, therefore, I refrain from making any comment on his letter to me which you print to-day.

"Yours faithfully,
"F. H. ELY."

"THE PALACE, ELY,
"*May 21st.*"

In the first chapter of the book which fulfilled this promise I find some rather surprising comments upon my letter. The first is a suggestion that, when I signed a memorial and wrote the letter, I doubted whether the Bishops understood the point of the various memorials which had been addressed to them.

Since the Bishops had these and other similar words before them, it is clear ex abundantia *that they had the Lord's Virgin Birth and the Lord's Resurrection on the third day fully in mind when they used the phrase "the historical facts stated in the Creeds"* (*B. and C.*, pp. 26, 27).

It is also suggested (*B. and C.*, pp. 19, 24) that I similarly misconceived the minds of the Bishops of the Lambeth Conference. I am at a loss to discover which of my sentences can be so misinterpreted: for I am really incapable of making a charge of what amounts to idiocy against the Bishops. But in case any other reader should have failed in like

manner to understand my letter, I will restate the substance in other words.

The Bishops affirm that "the historical facts stated in the Creeds are an essential part of the Faith of the Church": but they have nowhere explained what they mean by the term "historical fact."

The natural interpretation of their words would be "all those clauses in the Creeds which refer to events as taking place in time." For all those clauses were undoubtedly believed by their authors, and by the early Church generally, to be literal statements of fact.

But the public utterances of several leading Bishops preclude us from understanding the words in this natural sense. For some of them have expressly repudiated the literal interpretation of "He descended into hell" and "He ascended into heaven"; and probably some of them would join with the Bishop of Ely in explaining away "the resurrection of the flesh," as applied to our Lord's Resurrection.[1]

Since they have not either given a new definition of the term "historical fact," or enumerated the clauses which are to be understood literally, both their example and their silence allow to others such "a wide liberty of interpretation" as was asked for by some of the memorialists. The freedom which most of the Bishops use in this respect of three clauses may be claimed by others in respect of a fourth or a fifth.

[1] *The Gospel in the Light of Historical Criticism*, pp. xxvii–xxxiv.

The Bishop of Ely thinks so well of the other Bishops that he is confident that they agree with him. And he quotes a number of documents which tend to show that such, in fact, was their private opinion. But that is not the point. I assumed throughout that, as individuals, most of them held the views which he attributes to them. What concerns me and the other memorialists is their deliberate and corporate pronouncement. Therefore the array of quotations, which fills a large space in the first chapter of *B. and C.*, is not relevant. Instead of being a wall of defence, as he supposes, it is really no more than a smoke-screen which serves to conceal, from himself at least, his evasion of the real issue. The main contention of my letter, therefore, remains unchallenged.

One minor point seems to require a brief notice. The Bishop draws attention to the fact that while I quoted the last two sentences of § 2 in the Bishop's reply,[1] I omitted the first sentence. That sentence, read in the light of Bishop Gore's speech,[2] was generally understood to authorise the position which Dr. Sanday described a little later as his own.[3] It said in effect, "You need not affirm

[1] See above, p. 28.

[2] He is thus reported in *The Church Times* of May 1st, 1914: "He did not pretend that every word in the resolutions was such as he should have wished it to be; but he thought it did precisely hit the point, and that what it said was simple, serious, and sufficient. He accepted, the more he had thought about it, the word *denial*. He was quite sure they needed to be extremely tender in all trials of doubt. But they must make up their minds at least when they felt that men had at last got down *on the other side of belief* in the occurrence of these specific miracles."

[3] See the paper read to the Churchmen's Union on June 10th, 1915, and printed in *The Modern Churchman* for June 1915.

these 'historical facts,' but you must not deny them." The distinction, as I pointed out in my manual,[1] is very important. Since I had expressly ruled out denial, there seemed no strong reason for quoting the words which forbade it. But, warned of the use which might be made of such an omission, I included it in a draft of my letter. It was afterwards omitted simply in order that I might keep my promise to the Editor of *The Times* that I would not exceed the 1,500 words which he was good enough to allow me. When I sent my letter to the Bishop, I added a private note (of which he quotes part on p. 185) explaining that the limits of space were answerable for several omissions. Though I did not specify this particular omission, it would have been natural to assume that it was one of them. I was therefore somewhat surprised to find it made a ground for charging me with dishonesty.

These words Canon Glazebrook wholly ignores. It is difficult to exaggerate the seriousness of this neglect. For they are momentous words; and they are absolutely essential to an understanding of the position of the Bishops.

I am content to leave this matter to the judgment of any fair-minded reader.

[1] See *The Faith of a Modern Churchman*, p. 71, which is quoted *supra*, p. vi.

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